Friday, March 10, 2017

Jammu-Kashmir: A Blot on the Concept of Bharat and the Vision of Dr. Ambedkar

Bharatavarsha (the ancient name for the Indian subcontinent) has historically been a land of great socio-cultural diversity and lingua-religious heterogeneity from times immemorial. The fragmented governance structure in the British Raj─ comprising of British India, a quasi-federation of provinces and presidencies on one hand, and, the suzerainty of princely states on the other─ only enhanced the regional and parochial fabric of India. On top, the British exercise of supremacy over and institution of polity for its territories was varied, eclectic and, often, nuanced.
Therefore, the main challenge before the Constituent Assembly was to weave together a unified, cohesive country within a diverse, pluralistic society. Dr. Ambedkar and the Drafting Committee not only conceived a robust central regime, but also provided for the seamless integration of motley princely states into that new, unified national identity. The assimilation was engineered with a unique blend of unitary and federal characteristics in the constitutional scheme. The objective was to curtail divisive or disruptive forces within a diverse society spread across disparate regions. Hence, Dr. Ambedkar envisioned and enshrined a strong, powerful Centre in the Constitution to minimise the threat of fissiparous tendencies within sections of people.  

Concept of “Sovereignty”

To fully appreciate the vision of Dr. Ambedkar, the architect of modern India, one has to comprehend the concept of “sovereignty” well. Judge Huber defined “sovereignty” in the famous Island of Palmas Case as the independent right to exercise “in regard to a portion of the globe, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” In other words, it is the supreme and overarching power of a country to enact and enforce laws within its territorial domain. The paramountcy cannot be shared or transferred. Possessing complete sovereignty is an essential attribute for the existence of any country.
There are two vital and complementary aspects to the concept of sovereignty, namely, ‘functional sovereignty’ and ‘seat of sovereignty’. ‘Seat of sovereignty’ denotes the moorings, that is, the source of sovereignty. It is the actual locus or situs where sovereignty rests and resides. On the contrary, ‘functional sovereignty’ is about how sovereignty manifests and gets exercised. The presence of a “cause and effect” relationship between “situs” and “functionality” as a distinguishing feature does not mean that sovereignty is divisible.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Vision

Dr. Ambedkar and the Constitution Makers envisaged the vesting of sovereignty with the people collectively and not severally or specifically to any specific group, class or segment of society. In fact, the realization that sovereignty had to be embodied in the people was indelibly imbued in the minds of the Constitution Makers. It was the ideological choice for the constitutional architecture of a new Bharat. The collective ownership and possession of sovereignty by the people of India was aimed at empowering the masses. It was also meant to prevent local, regional or sectoral aspirations and claims of sovereignty either transcending national unity or threatening territorial integrity.
The Constitution Makers endowed the Government of India and the state governments with the functional powers for exercising sovereignty on behalf of people of Bharat as a whole. Dr. Ambedkar expressed and embedded in the Constitution this notion of “the sovereign” through a participatory democracy with no limitations on the power or paramountcy of the people of India. Indeed his vision of sovereignty belonging to and residing in the people is the foundational principle of our Constitution.

Sovereignty under British Imperialism

A historical review of British imperialism and the independence struggle in the sub-continent during the 20th Century sheds ample light on the progressive democratization of governance through relinquishment of powers to the people. After the rebellion of 1857 the corporate rule of British East India Company over the subcontinent was abolished and the “seat of sovereignty” transferred to the British Crown under the Government of India Act, 1858. Consequently, the Court of Directors of the company was dissolved and its powers transitioned to the Secretary of State for India, an appointee of the Crown. Likewise, the Board of Control, the arm of the British Government responsible till then for managing the empire’s interests in India, was disbanded too. 
The Act of 1858 also heralded the termination of dual governance of territories by the Crown and the Company that had existed earlier. It empowered the Crown to appoint its representative, the Viceroy, as the Head of Government in the subcontinent. The Viceroy was made responsible to the Secretary of State. This governance model continued despite modifications introduced through Government of India Acts of 1912, 1915 and 1919. In general, the form of government, in British India comprising of provinces and presidencies, was unitary in character with a strong, absolute central establishment, which derived its powers from the Crown. The princely states enjoyed varying degrees of limited autonomy as weak vassals under the suzerainty of the British Crown. Presidencies, provinces and the princely states derived their limited administrative authority through devolution under the sovereignty of the colonial power. In other words, jurisdictional powers, that is, “functional sovereignty” (limited as it was) flowed to the bottom from the “seat of sovereignty”, namely, the Crown at the top.  
The Government of India Act, 1935, was in response to the freedom struggle and demand of Indians for autonomy. The legislative changes in the Act of 1935 reflected the aspirations of people for self-rule. It provided for a bicameral “Federation of India” consisting of provinces and princely states, even as it excluded Burma from the territory of colonial India. But then, the enacted bicameralism and federalism did not materialize since the statutory prerequisite─ of a majority of invited princely states accepting the proposal─ was not met. British India continued to be governed under the provisions of the Act of 1919. The Federal Court was set up under the 1935 Act though. Provincial autonomy was accorded through the constitution of provincial and central legislatures, for which elections were held in 1937.
In effect, very little in the governance set-up changed after the Act of 1935. The “top-down” flow of “functional sovereignty” from the “seat of sovereignty”, the Crown endured. The “Strong Suzerainty-Weak Vassals” relationships between the British Crown and the princely states too continued as before.

The March towards Indian Independence

In the aftermath of World War II, calls for freedom became increasingly strident. With an economy ruined and ravaged by war, Britain lacked the resources to contain the escalating civic unrest in India. Strikes, protests and agitations galore took their toll. The Christmas Island Mutiny of 1942 portended a tinderbox-like situation in India even as the discovery of vast oil deposits in the Middle East marked a strategic shift in geopolitical compulsions. Finally, the landslide win of the pro-decolonisation, Clement-Atlee-led Labour Party, against the imperialistic Conservative Party in the general elections of 1945, indeed sounded the death knell on the British Empire in the subcontinent. So, in September 1945, Viceroy Lord Wavell called for fresh elections to the legislatures of British India provinces. It was also declared that a constitution-making body would be convened after the elections. A total of 1585 seats went for the polls in December 1945 and January 1946 under the Government of India Act, 1935.
The Bombay Revolt of February, 1946 was perhaps the straw that broke the camel’s back. It surely would have put to rest any thoughts of procrastination that the British may have harboured on the transfer of power in India. Soon the British Government constituted and sent a 3-member, ministerial team on a mission to discuss with Indian leaders and devise the plan for devolution of power. This Cabinet Mission’s main aim was to pave the way for India’s freedom.
In the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 (proposed on 16th June, 1946), the twin-nation theory was propounded as a compromise formula to satisfy the aspirations of Congress and Muslim League. A long-term settlement plan was conceptualised, envisaging a “Union of India” with a relatively-weak centre and strong provinces. The Congress Working Committee (CWC) disapproved of the limited powers afforded to the Centre in the plan. As a proponent of a strong “Central authority”, it did not officially accept the plan. Yet, it resolved to join the proposed Constituent Assembly for framing the constitution of a free, united and democratic India. The Congress, and later the Muslim League, participated jointly in the “interim government” formed in September 1946, despite initial reservations against its composition.
Eventually, the Constituent Assembly was convened in December 1946. A total of 292 seats in the Constituent Assembly were assigned to British India provinces and presidencies. The newly-elected representatives in the provincial assemblies indirectly elected members of the Constituent Assembly, through a single transferable-vote system of proportional representation. The total membership of the Constituent Assembly was 389, consisting of 292, 93 and 4 representatives respectively of provinces, princely states and chief commissioner provinces of Delhi, Ajmer-Mewar, Coorg and British Baluchistan.
Explaining the effects of the Cabinet Mission Plan, N Gopalaswami Ayyangar later stated in the Constituent Assembly that:
“…sovereign powers over India as a whole now vest in His Majesty… Those powers are exercisable both over British India and over Indian States, though the quantum of those powers and the manner of their exercise differ… The act of ceding sovereignty, that is transfer of the power…relate to the whole of India…. The Mission's statement, therefore, that when British power is withdrawn, the States become independent, should be construed to mean that such sovereignty as His Majesty in fact exercises over Indian States will stand ceded back to the people of those States.”

Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the Princely States

Much of the Cabinet Mission’s efforts were aimed at the formulation of a plan, acceptable to both Congress and Muslim League, for the transfer of sovereignty to the people of India on the lapse of British paramountcy and declaration of independence. Further, the Mission declared that the suzerainty of the Crown over the princely states would cease on the devolution of power to the two proposed dominions of India and Pakistan. All bipartite relations, treaty engagements and mutual obligations between the Crown and each of the princely states were to be unilaterally dissolved and abrogated on partition of India. The princely states were not to be recognised as separate international entities. Yet, under the twin-nation formula, the rulers were assured that they would be absolutely free to join one or other of the two successor-Dominions. They were advised though that wishes of people and territorial contiguity should be factored into their respective choice of accession. Pending the final decision of the States’ accession, the respective Dominion was to assume duties of protection borne till then by Britain. Mr. Clement Atlee, Prime Minister of United Kingdom, confirmed this arrangement in his address on the then tabled Indian Independence Bill, 1947, in the House of Commons on 10th July, 1946. The British Government position was reiterated by Mr. William Hare, the Earl of Listowel and Secretary of State for India and Burma, during his speech on 16th July, 1946, in the House of Lords.
Indeed, the Indian Independence Act, 1947─ passed by the British Parliament and assented to by the Crown on 18th July 1946─ accorded independence to and created only the two Dominions of India and Pakistan. Further, the Act in its entirety makes no express provision about the transfer of power to the princely states. Besides, various Sections of the Act─ specifically Sections 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) ─ only provide for the accession of princely states into either of the Dominions and removal of difficulties and impediments to such accession. In fact, the Prime Minister Mr. Clement Atlee unambiguously clarified the British position on the status of princely states, in the House of Commons on 10th July, 1946, as follows:
“It would...be unfortunate if, owing to the formal severance of their paramountcy relations with the Crown, [the Princely States] were to become islands cut off from the rest of India…In fact, already a large number of the States have declared their willingness to enter into relationships with the new Dominions, and some have been represented in the Constituent Assembly of India. It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that all States will, in due course, find their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions…If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government to any State which has decided to cut adrift from its neighbors and assert its independence, I would say to the ruler of that State, "Take your time and think again. I hope that no irrevocable decision to stay out will be taken prematurely."
Thus, when a ruler executed the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India, he surrendered paramountcy over all territories of his state to the Dominion of India. Consequently, any sovereignty or independence claims ceased and subjects therein became an integral part of the common pool of the “People of India”. By sanctioning integration with the new Dominion of India, the plenipotentiary rights of the ruler, over the territory of the princely state, got merged into the national pool of sovereignty, represented collectively by the Union. Besides, representation of princely states in the Constituent Assembly of India was subject to and contingent upon the acceptance of the resolution passed on the Aims and Objectives.

Accession of Jammu-Kashmir

In the specific case of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu-Kashmir, the ruler not only executed the Instrument of Accession to establish an “irrevocable relationship” with India, but also nominated four representatives to the Constituent Assembly of India. Hence, when the nominees, namely, Messrs. Sheikh M. Abdullah, M.M. Afzal Beg, M.M. Sayeed Masoodi and Motiram Baigra, took the pledge and signed the “Members Register” of the Constituent Assembly on 16th June, 1949, the integration of all the territories of that erstwhile princely State of Jammu-Kashmir with India assumed finality.
The Constitution was framed keeping in mind a unified India within the diverse ethos. The unification was accomplished through an atypical “federal structure”.  Dr. Ambedkar was convinced that if the princely states were allowed to retain sovereignty, then territorial integrity would become fragile, thus defeating the very vision of a “united, well-integrated” Bharat. It would also jeopardise the installation of an effective participatory democracy. And, most importantly, such a construct would run contrary to the basic tenet of the People of India being the true owners of sovereignty.
Therefore, the Constitution was drafted to provide for a strong centre based on the foundational tenet that the People of Bharat are the “repository of sovereignty”. This cardinal principle is apparent from the resolution that Sri. J. Nehru moved in the Constituent Assembly on 13th December, 1946 stating:
“This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic…WHEREIN the territories…shall be a Union…WHEREIN all power and authority…are derived from the people…”
It has been fallaciously argued that the ruler of Jammu-Kashmir retained limited sovereignty and did not merge with the Dominion of India, consequent to which the State Government, as successor to the ruler, enjoys special status and autonomous character. The flawed, irrational reasoning stems from the Instrument of Accession, which states:
“8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my Sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as a Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.”
The contention that the State of Jammu-Kashmir possessed “limited sovereignty” is faulty. Indeed, Para 8 does not unequivocally qualify the noun “continuance of my Sovereignty” with either “to perpetuity” or “in the interim”. Nonetheless, the only logical conclusion is that the vesting of sovereignty in the ruler was of a “transient nature” and it got extinguished once the ruler’s representatives partook in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly of India and adoption of the Constitution. A contrarian interpretation would obstruct and frustrate the flow of sovereignty to any other state, person or entity.

Integration of Princely States

Further, the inclusion of representatives of the erstwhile princely states in the Constituent Assembly of India implied their complete and seamless merger with the Republic of India. It also snuffed out any and all paramountcy rights or claims of the ruler, a necessary condition for ensuring parity between provinces and princely states in the new Union of India. Then again, any sovereign apparatus, be it monarchic or democratic state, ultimately derives its sanction from the will of the people. In this day and age, it would be impossible for hereditary monarchs to maintain sovereignty under the mediaeval or archaic creed of divine right or endowed authority.  This idea was completely discarded with the creation of the Constituent Assembly of India, which consisted of delegates from all provinces and princely states, who collectively represented the entire nation. Hence, the constitution of sovereign, independent Bharat is the concrete expression of the will of all people, its “situs of sovereignty”, as a whole.
The princely states did not treat themselves special or unequal constituents of the nation vis-à-vis the provinces. The spirit of unity was commensurately reflected in the speeches of their representatives during the debates. The delegate from the State of Baroda, Sir B.L. Mitter’s sentiments─ echoed by Sardar K.M. Panikkar of the State of Bikaner─ epitomized the nationalistic fervor within the Constituent Assembly. He articulated as follows:
“We, the States, are an integral part of India… We, therefore, want to share the responsibility of framing the Constitution…We are at one with you in that the Indian Union should be strong in the Centre so that India may hold her head high in the comity of nations. We do not believe in isolated independent existence, which can only weaken the Union. We shall join you wholeheartedly in a spirit of co-operation and not in any spirit or securing special privileges at the cost of the Union.”
The assertions of the representatives of princely states, as also the inherent legal mechanism of a body composed with representatives of people and bestowed with constituent power, signify the merger of their sovereign identity and political existence into the new country of Bharat. Hence, sovereignty resides wholly and squarely in all the people of India, and NOT either partly with any State Government or separately with the people of any class, group or sector, such as, say, the residents of Jammu-Kashmir.

Extent of Federalism in the Constitution of India

There are for sure many distinct forms of constitutional structures and governance models, which define the relationship between the Union and the constituent states or provinces within the Union. In the “unitary form”, the Centre, that is, the Union is strong as compared to the constituent states and wields most, if not all, the powers. Being endowed with less or minimal powers, the constituent states are weak. The United Kingdom is a good example of a “unitary form” of political structure. In the “federal form”, the balance of power tilts towards the constituent states, which enjoy a great deal of discretion. Though Union-State linkages exist, the constituent states are empowered with greater degree of legislative and administrative freedoms. The United States of America has a federal structure in its polity.
Our Constitution Makers described “India, that is Bharat” as a “Union of States” [and not as “Federation of States”] in Article 1. Considerable thought and discussion went into this foundational aspect of our nationhood. Dr. Ambedkar repeatedly rejected pleas to add ‘federation’ instead of ‘union’. The word ‘union’ prevents constituent states from having the freedom to secede from the union. This unifies all States in perpetuity, no doubt. It also means that they all are equal in status, without any of them being eligible for unique claims or special privileges of their own.
Through Article 1, the framers of our Constitution demolished the distinction between the erstwhile British India territories and the princely states. Article 1 defines all constituent units of India as ‘States’ irrespective of whether they were provinces, presidencies or princely states earlier. The use of the word ‘States’ in “Union of States”, which refers to an inseparable unit of India territory, is not to be confused with that in “princely states”.  Further, Article 1 references the list the States comprising Bharat in Schedule 1, which includes the State of Jammu-Kashmir. Indeed, the bogey of “autonomy” and “special status” are often raised baselessly in case of Jammu-Kashmir.
An irrefutable fact is that the “Dominion of India” came into existence as an integral entity first under the Indian Independence Act, 1947. On the lapse of British paramountcy, “functional sovereignty” devolved onto the “successor Government of India”. The “seat of sovereignty” though was transferred to the People of India, who elected representatives to the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly then exercised its “constituent power” to draft, adopt and ratify Constitution of India, which conferred “constituted power” on States for the exercise of “constitutional duties” by “constitutional authorities”.
The division of powers between the central and state governments is enshrined as a crucial facet of the Constitution, which is devolutionary in nature. Thus, there is delegation or decentralization, as the case may be, of some powers onto the constituent units, namely, the States, which were created through the exercise of powers vested in the Constituent Assembly.
The foregoing bears testament to the fact that Bharat has been envisioned and established as a robust union of states with federal characteristics. Contrarily, US federalism emanates from the constituent States, which came together to form the Centre. Indeed, nowhere in the Constitution of India is the word “federal” used except to refer to “Federal Courts”, which were constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935. Use of the word “federal” would have perhaps diminished the import of the unitary features of India, the “Union of States”. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has variously described our Constitution as: “more unitary than federal”, “[having] strong unitary features” and so on in its judgments. The Sarkaria Commission observation that our Constitution “…has federal features…not…in classical sense” too reflects the consonance, consistency of views. Dr. Ambedkar clarified the rationale during the Constituent Assembly debates as follows:
“India…, the Federation was not the result of an agreement by the States to join in a Federation…. The Federation is a Union because it is indestructible. Though the country and the people may be divided into different States for convenience of administration the country is one integral whole, its people a single people living under a single imperium derived from a single source. The Americans had to wage a civil war to establish that the States have no right of secession and that their Federation was indestructible. The Drafting Committee thought that it was better to make it clear at the outset….”

National Unity and Integrity under the Constitution

The third theme is that India was envisaged as a unified, cohesive nation endued with a strong Centre.  This would gather the power of the people at the centre, that is, the Union to create a unified country, rather than a group of fragmented segments claiming individual sovereignty. Thus, the country remains de jure unitary.  The Constitution endows a majority of the powers on the Centre, which is strong vis-à-vis the units, i.e. constituent States. This arrangement was necessary to foster the feeling of integration in the country and effective administration. He was convinced that only a strong centre could ensure that regional differences do not dominate operating political discourse or structures. Furthermore, invested with residuary powers, the Centre has grown to overshadow and eclipse the State Governments over time. The strong centre not only acts as a strong centripetal force that binds the country together, but also introduces uniformity and ease of administration. The Union Government also has the power, freedom and authority to interfere in the affairs of a State whenever it is expedient in the interests of the nation. The constitutional construct becomes unitary in such scenarios.
Unity of the nation could not be compromised due to regional diversity or political divergences. Dr. Ambedkar overcame two weaknesses of stereotypical federalism, namely, “arduous rigidity” in the Centre-State division of powers and “acute legalism” that requires frequent judicial intervention for interpreting provisions and determining constitutionality of actions. These weaknesses are endemic to any federal system, which adopts dual polity and loose coupling of Union-State. He inculcated federal characteristics in our Constitution through a long list of concurrent subjects, which helps achieve “higher degree of flexibility” and “fewer transgression of powers” in Centre-State relations.
The Indian constitution, though embracing federalism limitedly, achieves uniformity in “basic matters that are vital for maintaining unity.” Explaining this point in the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar said that:
“A dual judiciary, a duality of legal codes and a duality of civil services…are the logical consequences of a dual polity…inherent in a federation. The Indian Federation, though a dual polity, has no dual judiciary at all. The High Courts and the Supreme Court form one single integrated judiciary having jurisdiction and providing remedies in all cases… This is done to eliminate all diversity in all remedial procedure.”
Dr. Ambedkar achieved uniformity and unity of the Indian federation through commonality of basic laws, especially civil, corporate and criminal statutes (such as penal code, property laws, law of evidence, etc.), be they substantive or procedural laws. These subjects are either placed in the Union list or in the Concurrent List in order to preserve unity without impeding or impairing federalism.
Besides, the Indian Constitution provides for dual service. Yet, it reserves certain strategic posts in its administrative set-up for the civil services cadre at the Union. Again, without depriving or disrupting the right of States to form their own civil services and administrative machinery, a pan-India recruitment exists for appointment of bureaucrats with uniform scale of pay and inter-state transferability within the Union. Thus, Dr. Ambedkar created multiple institutions which ensure that the nation remains strong and unified through these three crucial provisions, namely, single, seamless judiciary, common civil services for manning important posts, and, uniformity-in fundamental substantive and procedural laws encompassing civil and criminal matters.

Provisions in the Jammu-Kashmir Constitution

Eventually, the Constitution of India came into force on 26th January, 1950. Under the “temporary provisions of Article 370” in the Constitution of India, elections in the State were held in 1951 for the formation of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu-Kashmir. The Assembly, invested with the power to draft the Constitution for the State within the constitutional framework of India, began its work on 5th November, 1951. After an impassioned address by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad on 15th February, 1954, the members of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu-Kashmir passed a unanimous resolution ratifying the irrevocable accession of the State with the Union of India by adopting the “Report of the Drafting Committee”.
After about five years of exhaustive debates and discussions, the Constitution of Jammu-Kashmir was adopted and it come into force fully on 26th January, 1957. The Constitution of Jammu-Kashmir categorically declares in Sections 3 and 5 as follows:
“3. Relationship of the State with the Union of India.─ The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.
…
5. Extent of Executive and Legislative Power of the State.─ The executive and legislative power of the State extends to all matters except those with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State under…the Constitution of India.”
On top, Section 147 affirms that any provision of the Constitution of Jammu-Kashmir except Sections 3, 5 and 147 may be amended. From the foregoing, it is amply clear that the State of Jammu-Kashmir merged their identity with the Union of India. In short, the integration with India of Jammu-Kashmir is irreversible. Hence, it is subject to the “seat of sovereignty” vested in the People of India as a composite group and not people belonging to any one narrow State, group, class or segment.
There is a tendency in some quarters to make a case for partial sovereignty, by misconstruing the words: “We, the people of Jammu & Kashmir…” in the Preamble of the Constitution of that State. It behooves the protagonists of this view to keep in mind not only that the phrase is a replica of the language in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, but also that the people of Jammu-Kashmir, as an identifiable group, are not historically extraneous to or ethnically incongruous with the people of India. Neither can the Preamble be interpreted in isolation of the operative parts of any Constitution. When the representatives of the erstwhile princely state partook in the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly of India and adopted the Constitution of India on November 26, 1949, Jammu-Kashmir became an integral part of Indian territories and a State subject to its jurisdiction. It was added to the First Schedule of the Constitution of India as a “Part-B” State along with other princely states such as Mysore, Hyderabad, etc. Thus, the identity and destiny of Jammu-Kashmir were merged into that of India, a nation of immense diversity, yet, created with unity of purpose, fraternity of people and harmony of values.

Concluding Remarks

The State of Jammu-Kashmir deviates from the vision of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. It transgresses several wise and well-founded principles of our Constitution Makers. The aberrations extend to denying original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Duality of domestic laws in that State has created problems too. A cursory scrutiny shows that many substantive and procedural laws of India are invalid there. This has unfortunately led to the curtailment of minority rights (e.g., lack of reservation for other backward castes, etc.); discrimination against women (e.g., property and inheritance rights, inapplicability of Section 304-B of IPC on presumption of dowry deaths, etc.); and, derogation of fundamental rights (e.g., right to education, inapplicability of Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution of India, etc.).  
Dr. Ambedkar was a visionary, who realised that unity and uniformity should be the pillars of the Constitution. The essence of the concept of Bharat, as enshrined in the Constitution, is equality and equal treatment of all persons and constituent States, regardless of region, class or segment. He was aware that any special treatment of even one former princely state would create insurmountable challenges for the supremacy of the Constitution of India.
Despite not having solid legal, political or historical grounds, there are many discordant voices demanding separate constitutional identity in the State of Jammu-Kashmir because of the failure to respect Dr. Ambedkar’s vision for India and its uniform application throughout India. The misguided political activists, Kashmiri separatists, Pakistani sympathisers and their ilk, within Jammu-Kashmir and without, are jeopardizing the long-term prosperity of the state and its people.
Thus, the only long-term, sustainable solution for all the social, economic and political woes of Jammu-Kashmir is the implementation of the vision of Dr. Ambedkar in letter and spirit.
The abrogation of Article 370 would be a good beginning!

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

Four Glaring Mistakes in the Judgment of the J&K High Court


In a recent judgment, a two-Judge bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir ruled that Article 370 of the Constitution of India had assumed permanence and that the provision is beyond amendment, repeal or abrogation. The Hon’ble Judges Janak Raj Kotwal and Hasnain Massodi have surely used convoluted logic, perhaps out of ignorance, if not incompetence, to conclude that the said Article is “beyond amendment, repeal or abrogation.”  It appears that, in the process of making invalid, inaccurate, inappropriate and mostly untenable arguments, they have extensively adopted a policy, intentionally or otherwise, of “suppressing the truth and suggesting the false”.

I had critically evaluated the judgment and blogged a rebuttal earlier. That blog post though was a tad too legal in its linguistics; hence this plain English write-up about the lapses and loopholes in the judgment.  

On the whole, there are four major mistakes, misconceptions or misrepresentations in the Hon’ble Court’s judgment:

Mistake 1: Sovereign Powers of the Maharaja Hari Singh
The (erstwhile princely) State of Jammu and Kashmir regained absolute sovereignty on 15th August 1947 on the lapse of British paramountcy. Hence, Raja Hari Singh had the power to opt for independent statehood.

The Cabinet Mission’s “Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy”, dated May 12, 1946, no doubt, represented the substance of what was communicated to the representatives of the States at their first interviews with the Mission. The document did enunciate the idea of independent statehood for the princely states.

But then, that Memorandum was drawn up while the Mission was in discussions with Indian National Congress (INC) and Muslim League (ML) leaders. Many parleys were held subsequently with party leaders to discuss proposals for transfer of power. Congress and League leaders did not agree on the terms of the Mission’s formula. Hence, the Cabinet Mission to India announced its “suggested” plan unilaterally on 16th May 1946 (but, published on 22nd May 1946), which looked to create a united dominion of India as a loose confederation of provinces. In that plan, the Mission expected princely states to negotiate their way in the Union government as part of the transfer of power. Retention of paramountcy and attainment of independence by the states was not envisaged. Besides, both the Congress and the League denounced that proposal of May 16, 1946.

The Mission then proposed an alternative plan on 16th June 1946, wherein the idea of partition was mooted. While the Congress rejected this plan outright, the League withdrew acceptance eventually.

Statements of the Secretary of State, Lord Listowel, and the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten─ made on 16th July 1947 and 25th July 1947 respectively─ clearly affirm that the British government, under the formula worked out in the Indian Independence Act, 1947, intended to create only two dominions, viz., India and Pakistan. Attainment of absolute sovereignty and independent statehood was only a theoretical possibility for the princely states. Historical evidence stands testament to the fact that not even one of the princely states eventually became an independent, sovereign State.

Then again, the Government of India Act, 1935─ which was adopted and operated as part of the constitutional basis for the dominions of India and Pakistan after independence, till the Constitution came into force─ also provided for representation of Jammu and Kashmir in the Federal Legislature. This clearly indicates that Jammu & Kashmir not being part of either of the two dominions was not envisaged at all.

If sovereignty and independence had indeed been a viable option, would not the British have made arrangements for allocating part of the Armed Forces to the State of Jammu & Kashmir and placing it under the command of the Maharaja, so as to enable him to defend his territory better?

Mistake 2: Instrument of Accession
The immediate object of accession was to make possible and legitimize deployment of troops of Indian Army to the State. The attending circumstances of the Instrument of Accession indicate that a Constitutional framework was conceived where under the State of Jammu and Kashmir was to enjoy a special constitutional status.

The object of the accession is immaterial in the context of the result of the accession, i.e., the integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Dominion of India. Given the prevailing circumstances of an invasion of his kingdom, the Maharaja made a choice out of his own volition. The Government of India did not coerce, compel or unduly influenced him into signing the Instrument of Accession. Consequently, the validity or legitimacy of the Instrument can hardly be called to question.

Further, the Instrument of Accession that Maharaja Hari Singh signed was an exact replica of what about 500 other princely states executed. Besides, there is no historical evidence of any overt or covert commitment to confer “special constitutional status” on J&K, except for the “wish” of Lord Mountbatten’s government that the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people, once law and order had been restored and Kashmir soil cleared of the invader. The latter condition is yet to be achieved. Nonetheless, a “wish”, under any and all interpretations of linguistic constructs or “jurisprudential” tenets is not tantamount to a contractual promise, or obligation, or commitment for according any “special constitutional status”.

Furthermore, that “wish” or “desire” was extinguished once Lord Mountbatten’s government was replaced by C. Rajagopalachari’s government.

Clearly, under the terms of this Instrument of Accession, the Ruler exercised his discretion in designating four of his state subjects, viz., Sheikh Abdullah, Motiram Baigra, Mirza Mohmmad Afzal Beg and Maulana Mohammad Sayeed Masoodi, to represent the State of Jammu & Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly of India. And, when the four representatives affixed their signatures, the Maharaja accorded his unconditional acceptance to the Constitution of India. Thus, Maharaja Hari Singh bestowed his allegiance to the sovereignty of India and the supremacy of its Constitution.

Mistake 3: Special Status for Jammu & Kashmir
The State was to stand on a different pedestal after accession and to be given distinct and different status as regards constitutional powers.

A comprehensive review of the transcripts of the Constituent Assembly proceedings show that Shri. Ayyangar referred to Draft Clause 306A (i.e., Article 370 in the Drat Constitution) as an “interim system / arrangement” four times. He also made a mention thrice of the “special conditions” that necessitated the inclusion of such “interim or temporary provisions”. Under no stretch of one’s imagination can an “interim”, i.e., “temporary” provision desirable because of “special conditions” be deemed to confer “special status” on the State of J&K. Any attempt to justify the anointment of “special status” on Jammu and Kashmir by such reference to Constituent Assembly debates would be motivated, if not mischievous, manipulative or mala fide.

Further, during the intervening, transitional period between gaining of independence and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Government of India Act, 1950 was the constitutional framework of India. The princely States were kept out of the ambit of the Act. Consequently, after accession, other princely states, such as Mysore, too chose to be governed under their existing administrative and governance framework. Indeed, Mysore too convened a Constituent Assembly of its own to frame a Constitution, based on the provisions of the Instrument of Accession.

In other words, Article 370 or no Article 370, the Instrument of Accession had the relevant provisions empowering rulers to convene Constituent Assemblies for their respective States. Indeed, there is absolutely nothing exceptional or extraordinary about the decisions and declarations of the Ruler to convene the Constituent Assembly for the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Mistake 4: Article 370- The Link Connecting State of J&K with India
Article 370 is a permanent provision of the Constitution. It cannot be abrogated, repealed or even amended as since Constituent Assembly is no longer extant.

Article 370 is placed under the Part XXI of the Constitution of India. This Part was originally titled “Temporary, Transitional Provisions”. The word “Special” was added through a constitutional amendment later. The moot question is how a “temporary, transitional provision” can be interpreted to be “permanent”?

On top the members of the Constituent Assembly of J&K (CAJK) were all very erudite, experienced and accomplished people. There surely knew that the Constitution is not a rigid, static document; but a dynamic, constantly-evolving legislative framework, which binds people together. Had it been felt that the provisions of Article 370 were permanent and that it envisaged an ongoing role for the CAJK, then they surely would never have disbanded themselves. Furthermore, the CAJK clearly saw its role and terms of reference as being that of drafting the Constitution of J&K. They had neither the mandate nor the locus standi to advise or recommend the repeal of Article 370, which is / was a parliamentary prerogative.

Further, under our constitutional schema, only those parts of the Constitution which are not part of the Basic Structure (as held in various Supreme Court judgments) are amendable. Article 370 is not an integral part of the Basic Structure. This implies that it can be amended and even abrogated, provided such amendment or abrogation is not ultra vires the Constitution.

Hence, how can the sovereign rights of the Indian Statehood, supremacy of its Constitution and legislative powers of Parliament in a representative democracy be diminished or curtailed? Indeed, the Union cannot be denied the exercise of its sovereign powers because of a procedural lapse by the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir.

Now it is high time the people of Jammu and Kashmir initiated an honest dialogue and made an objective attempt to assess whether Article 370 has truly furthered the interests of the State. If the conclusion is that Article 370 has had a deleterious, detrimental effect on the State of Jammu and Kashmir and its people, then the State and Union should work towards either its amendment or its abrogation.

Blindly clinging on to Article 370 because of political pressures or perverse propaganda is a disservice to the great State of Jammu & Kashmir and its people.

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

THE TEN COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: A Critique of the Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in the Ashok Kumar Case

In a recent judgment, a two-Judge bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir ruled that Article 370 of the Constitution of India had assumed permanence and that the provision is beyond amendment, repeal or abrogation. The Court went on to say that Article 35A gives 'protection' to existing laws in force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute before the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir related to the right of the reserved category government servants to accelerated promotion provided under Section 6, J&K Reservation Act, 2004, read with Rule 9 & 34, J&K Reservation Rules, 2005.

I will desist from going into the merits of the specific controversy and the efficacy of the Court’s adjudication, because that is not the focus of this article. The focus herein is the objective analysis and critically evaluation of the Court’s rationale for concluding that Article 370 is “non-abrogable” and “non-amendable”.

The Cabinet Mission, 1946
1.       To begin with in Para 16 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Judges have stated:

“The State of Jammu and Kashmir ("the State" hereinafter) like other 600 and odd princely States, regained its sovereignty on 15th August 1947, on the lapse of British Paramountcy, enactment of Indian Independence Act 1947 and emergence of Dominions of India and Pakistan. This was made clear by Cabinet Mission Memorandum dated May 12, 1946 as regards "States Treaties and Paramountcy" and Statement of Viceroy of May 16, 1946, to the effect that "Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Government nor transferred to the new Government."

There is substantial distortion of facts, mischievous or otherwise, in the untenable averments that: “the State of Jammu and Kashmir...like other 600 and odd princely States, regained its sovereignty on 15th August 1947, on the lapse of British Paramountcy...”

The Cabinet Mission’s “Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy”, dated May 12, 1946─ presented to His Highness the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes (Note: Hajji Nawab Hafiz Sir Hamidullah Khan, the last ruling Nawab of Bhopal was the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes in 1946) on 12 May, 1946─ was drawn up while the Mission was in discussions with Indian National Congress (INC) and Muslim League (ML) leaders. It represented the substance of what was communicated to the representatives of the States at their first interviews with the Mission.

Various discussions were held subsequently with party leaders to discuss proposals for transfer of power. Congress and League leaders did not agree on the terms of the Mission’s formula. Hence, the Cabinet Mission to India announced its “suggested” plan unilaterally on May 16th 1946 (but, published on May 22nd 1946), which looked to create a united dominion of India as a loose confederation of provinces. The provisions regarding Indian (princely) States specified:

“After transfer of power to the British Indian Provinces, Great Britain would neither retain paramountcy over the Indian States itself nor transfer it to the new Government of British India. It was however hoped that the States would negotiate their way in the Union Government.”

Interestingly, the Hon’ble Judges while taking due cognizance of the first part of the provision, deemed it unnecessary to either (a) consider the part that talks about (princely) States negotiating “their way in the Union Government”; or, (b) mention the fact that retention of paramountcy and attainment of independence by the states was never envisaged.”  

Regardless, both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League rejected this May 16th, 1946 proposal.

The Mission then proposed an alternative plan on 16th June 1946, wherein the idea of partition was mooted. The Congress Party rejected this plan too was rejected. The Muslim League, which had initially accorded its acceptance, in its later resolution of July 29, 1946 withdrew its acceptance.

However, Lord Listowel, the Secretary of State for India, in his address to the House of Lords on the Indian Independence Bill, 1947, explained the operational aspects of independence on 16th July 1947 as follows:

“From that moment the appointments and functions of the Crown Representative and his officers will terminate and the States will be the masters of their own fate. They will then be entirely free to choose whether to associate with one or other of the Dominion Governments or to stand alone and His Majesty's Government will not use the slightest pressure to influence their momentous and voluntary decision. But I think it can hardly be doubted that it would be in the best interests of their own people, and of India as a whole, that in the fullness of time all the States should find their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions. It would be a tragedy for India, if the States were not to enrich the Motherland to which they belong with the martial valour for which they are renowned, and which they have displayed so gallantly in two world wars, with the tradition of service that animates their rules, and with the advanced social institutions that some of them possess.”

Then, again the Viceroy and Governor General of India and representative of the British Crown of erstwhile India, Lord Mountbatten, during his speech to the Chamber of Princes on July 25, 1947 affirmed that the Indian Independence Act, 1947, (which was enacted by the British Parliament on 18th July, 1947) had released “the States from all their obligations to the Crown." He said that they were technically independent, or, put another way, rudderless, on their own. The old links were broken, but "if nothing can be put in its place, only chaos can result— a chaos that "will hit the States first". He advised them therefore to forge relations with the new nation closest to them. As he put it bluntly, "you cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible".

In short, he told the rulers of the erstwhile princely states that in the circumstances it was best they make peace and sign the Instrument of Accession.

Thus, it is clear that the “attainment of independent statehood” was only a theoretical possibility. In reality, statehood was neither contemplated for nor offered to the princely states, regardless of how one interprets the memoranda, reports, statements, etc., of the Cabinet Mission and other functionaries of the British Crown. And, since the INC and ML rejected the proposals, any tacit understanding to the contrary between the Cabinet Mission and the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes was non-binding. They were, at best, sincere assurances and, at worst, empty promises of the Cabinet Mission. Historical evidence stands testament to the fact that not even one of the princely states eventually became an independent, sovereign State.

Limited Sovereign Powers at the Stroke of Midnight
2.       In Para 17 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Judges have put on record that:

“The Ruler of an Indian Princely State having regained absolute sovereignty on the lapse of Paramountcy and end of its Treaty obligations towards Imperial power, got power to decide future of his State including an option to accede to either of the two Dominions India or Pakistan in accordance with Cabinet Mission Memorandum 1946, Statements of June 3, July 25, 1947 and the Indian Independence Act, 1947.”

I have already talked about the fallacies of using the Cabinet Mission Memorandum to either logically validate or legitimately justify the attainment of absolute sovereignty by princely States on the lapse of British paramountcy. Statements of the Governor General and the representative of the British Crown in India, Lord Mountbatten, too have no legal standing or evidentiary value.

One would have to exclusively scrutinise the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the provisions thereunder to interpret the powers that devolved on the princely states post independence. It is a fact that the Indian Independence Act provides for the creation of only two dominions, viz., India and Pakistan [S. 1 and S. 2(4)]. No explicit provisions exist that support the view that princely States were accorded absolute sovereignty, for, had that been the case, then:
1.       S.1 of the Indian Independence Act would have referred to “British India” and not “India”. The General Clauses Act, 1897 makes it amply clear that the latter term was used synonymously with British Raj, which included the territory directly administered by Britain (and hence referred to as “British India”) as well as the princely states ruled by individual rulers under the paramountcy of the British Crown.
2.       S.8 of the Indian Independence Act would have provided suitably for a Constituent Assembly without representation from some (if not all) of the princely states, which chose, by virtue to having absolute sovereignty, to attain statehood by refusing to execute the Instrument of Accession.
3.       S.9 of the Indian Independence Act would have excluded application of the Government of India Act, 1935, either through provisions within the Act or by order of the Governor-General to make such provision for excluding such application to the princely states, either specifically or otherwise, which chose not to execute the Instrument of Accession.

Then again, the Government of India Act, 1935─ which despite never being fully implemented, was adopted and operated as part of the constitutional basis, for the dominions of India and Pakistan, after independence till the Constitution came into force─ also provided for representation of Jammu and Kashmir in the Federal Legislature. This clearly indicates that Jammu & Kashmir not being part of either of the two dominions was not envisaged at all.

If sovereignty and independence had indeed been a viable option, would not the British have made arrangements for allocating part of the Armed Forces to the State of Jammu & Kashmir and placing it under the command of the Maharaja, so as to enable him to defend his territory better?

Object of Accession
3.       In Para 20 of the judgment, the Learned Judges have recounted that:

“The immediate object of accession, unlike other Princely States...was to make possible and legitimize deployment of troops of Indian Army to the State...”

The object of the accession, notwithstanding its extent of proximity, is immaterial in the context of the result of the accession, i.e., the integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Dominion of India. Thus, when the Instrument of Accession was executed by the ruler of the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, who, as per the observations of the Judges in the preceding parts of the Judgment, enjoyed absolute sovereignty over the State.

Given the prevailing, exigent circumstances, the Maharaja made a choice out of his own volition. There was neither coercion nor undue influence exercised by the Government of India to compel him into signing the Instrument of Accession. Consequently, the validity or legitimacy of the Instrument can hardly be called to question.

Instrument of Accession
4.       In Para 21 of the judgment, the Learned Judges go on to mention:

“Though the Instrument of Accession signed by the Ruler of the State was similar to such Instruments signed by Rulers of other Princely States..., yet the attending circumstances of the signing of Instrument of Accession and its acceptance, sufficiently indicate that contemporaneously with the signing of the Instrument of Accession, a Constitutional framework was conceived where under the State unlike other States that acceded to Dominion of India, was to enjoy a special constitutional status.”

Indeed, it is ironical that the Hon’ble High Court has concluded that a “...constitutional framework was conceived where under the State...was to enjoy a special constitutional status” without relying on any evidence in support of such inference. The Instrument of Accession was exactly the same as what about 500 other princely states executed (Pg. 56 of Justice A.S. Anand’s book titled “The Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir: Its Development& Comments”).

The correspondence exchanged between Lord Mountbatten and Maharaja Hari Singh shows no traces of any such overt or covert commitment to any “special constitutional status,” except for the “wish” of Lord Mountbatten’s government that “as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”

To begin with, that was a “wish”, which under any and all tenets of jurisprudence is not tantamount to a contractual promise, or obligation, or commitment for according any “special constitutional status”. That “wish” was subject to the “restoration of law and order” in Kashmir and the “clearance of her soil of the invader.” The later, as we all know has not been achieved yet. Furthermore, that “wish” or “desire” was extinguished once Lord Mountbatten’s government was replaced by C. Rajagopalachari’s government.

The Learned Judges have also held that the condition mentioned in Para 4 of the Instrument of Accession confers special privileges on the State. The relevant Para 4 of the boilerplate Instrument reads: “―4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.”

The fact remains that no agreement was subsequently made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Hence, the Para merits neither further mention nor extra attention in the context of any assessment of whether any special status was conferred on the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The same argument of “special status” is applied to Para 7 of the Instrument of Accession, which reads as follows: “7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangement with the Government of India under any such future constitution.”

Clearly, under the terms of this Instrument of Accession, the Ruler exercised his discretion in designating four of his state subjects, viz., Sheikh Abdullah, Motiram Baigra, Mirza Mohmmad Afzal Beg and Maulana Mohammad Sayeed Masoodi, to represent the State of Jammu & Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly of India. And, when the four representatives affixed their signatures, the Maharaja accorded his unconditional acceptance to the Constitution of India.

Temporary Provisions for Jammu & Kashmir
5.       Further, the Hon’ble Court goes on to cite In Para 21 that:

“...the State was to stand on a different pedestal and to be given distinct and different status as regards constitutional powers, it was to enjoy after accession.”

The Judges have selectively quoted statements of Shri. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who identified eight special circumstances while introducing the Draft Clause 306A (corresponding to Article 370 in the Constitution of India), to support their views on special status for J&K.

A comprehensive review of the transcripts of the Constituent Assembly proceedings show that Shri. Ayyangar referred to Draft Clause 306A as an “interim system / arrangement” four times. He also made a mention thrice of the “special conditions” that necessitated the inclusion of such “interim or temporary provisions”. Under no stretch of one’s imagination can an “interim”, i.e., “temporary” provision desirable because of “special conditions” be deemed to confer “special status” on the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Any attempt to justify the anointment of “special status” on Jammu and Kashmir by such reference to Constituent Assembly debates would be motivated, if not mischievous, manipulative or mala fide.

Needless to say, the Learned Judges have based their assertions on completely fallacious statements and lopsided arguments, ill-founded on fact; unfounded in law, and, ill-conceived in logic.

The Judges also aver that the Dominion of India had decided to treat the State differently and not at par with other States because “the [decision] to accept the Constitution (of India)...in its entirety to their States...was not taken by the Ruler of the State.” This convoluted rationale does not hold up against the fact that the four representatives of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly of India unequivocally and unconditionally accepted and adopted the Constitution of India. Thus, through that act, the Ruler of Jammu & Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh bestowed his allegiance to the sovereignty of India and the supremacy of its Constitution.

State of Jammu and Kashmir: Equal or Unequal
6.       Then again, the Judges tenuously attempt to prove the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in Para 21 by reiterating that:

(iii) The Ruler a few months after signing of the Instrument of Accession, in the Declaration of 5th March, 1948 announced his resolve to constitute a National Assembly to frame Constitution for the State.
(iv) The State did not adopt Government of India Act, 1935 or the Constitution for the intervening period till Constituent Assembly was convened, Constitution framed and adopted, but decided to adopt and abide by Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act, 1939.

This misconception of “special status” is repeated in paras 24, 25, 26 and elsewhere. The attempt is to imply that the State's accession is somehow unique.

As a matter fact, during the intervening, transitional period between gaining of independence and the coming into force of the Constitution, i.e., between August 15, 1947 and January 26, 1950, the Government of India Act, 1950 was the constitutional framework of India. Section 2(1) of the Act makes it clear that the princely States were kept out of the ambit of the Act.

Consequently, after accession, other princely states, such as Mysore, too chose to be governed under their existing administrative and governance framework. The Maharaja of Mysore too had signed the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India, whereby, on all subjects, except foreign affairs, defence and communication, the state had absolute power to administer. Indeed, Mysore too convened a Constituent Assembly of its own to frame a Constitution. The members of the Constituent Assembly were elected by the old limited franchise during the elections held in February, 1948. But, it was felt that a separate Constitution for Mysore State was redundant. So, in November 1949 it was announced that on 26th January 1950, when India’s new Constitution would come into effect, the old Representative Assembly and the Legislative Council in Mysore State would be abolished and Mysore’s Constituent Assembly would become the main legislative body.

Thus, there is absolutely nothing exceptional or extraordinary about the decisions and declarations of the Ruler to convene the Constituent Assembly for the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Origin of Article 370
7.       In Para 23, the esteemed Judges look to imply that Article 370, with “its roots in paras 4 and 7 of the Instrument of Accession...provided for the convening of a Constituent Assembly to frame the Constitution of the State.”

This again is either a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of facts borne out of inadequate historical research. Like I have already mentioned, other states too (case in point, Mysore) had convened Constituent Assemblies based on the provisions of the Instrument of Accession. In other words, Article 370 or no Article 370, the Instrument of Accession had the relevant provisions empowering rulers to convene Constituent Assemblies for their respective States.

Article 370: The Link Between State of J&K and India
8.       The revered Judges then observe in Para 25 that:

“Article 370 is the only provision of the Constitution that applies to the State, on its own... [besides] Article 1 made applicable by sub clause (c) clause (1) Article 370. The Constituent Assembly (of Jammu and Kashmir) in terms of proviso to Clause (3) Article 370 is conferred power to recommend to the President that Article 370 be declared to cease to be operative or operate only with the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the recommendation, if any so made. It is only on such recommendations that the President in terms of Clause (3) Article 370 of the Constitution may, by public notification, declare that Article 370 shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date, specified in the notification. The Constituent Assembly did not make such a recommendation before its dissolution on January 25th, 1957. Resultantly, Article 370, notwithstanding its title showing it a "temporary provision" is a permanent provision of the Constitution. It cannot be abrogated, repealed or even amended as mechanism provided under Clause (3) of Article 370 is no more available.”

The juristic rationale above is weak and flawed, to say the least, for the following reasons:
1.       The political doyens, legal luminaries, social activists, cultural stalwarts and other representatives who entered the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir were all very erudite, experienced and accomplished people. They all had the confidence of the people of J&K reposed in them.
2.       In such a scenario, it is a safe assumption that they knew that no Constitution is a rigid, static document; but a dynamic, constantly-evolving legislative framework, which binds people together.
3.       Had the Constituent Assembly of J&K (CAJK) felt that the provision of Article 370 was permanent and that it envisaged an ongoing role for the Assembly, then they surely would never have disbanded themselves.
4.       Furthermore, the CAJK clearly saw its role and terms of reference as being that of drafting the Constitution of J&K. They had neither the mandate nor the locus standi to advise or recommend the repeal of Article 370, which is / was a parliamentary prerogative.
5.       Finally, as we all know, the Supreme Court of India has not included Article 370 as being an integral part of the Basic Structure, which implies that the provisions can be amended and even abrogated, provided such amendment or abrogation is not ultra vires the Constitution
6.       Hence, how can the sovereign rights of the Indian Statehood, supremacy of its Constitution and legislative powers of Parliament in a representative democracy be diminished or curtailed because of a technicality?
7.       Indeed, it is not morally, legally or constitutionally valid to impose fetters on parliamentary power conferred by the Constitution of India only because of an act of omission of a subordinate body set up under that same Constitution, the grundnorm of the land.

Thus, the views of the scholarly judges of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir, with regard to the perpetuation of Article 370, are such that in the constitutional schema, it is akin to the tail wagging the dog. The point is that the Union cannot be denied the exercise of its sovereign powers because of a procedural lapse by the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir.

Impact of Article 35A
9.       Next, the Hon’ble Judges have maintained in Para 27 that:

“The Article 35A gives protection to existing laws in force in the State and to any law enacted after 1954 by the State legislature, defining the classes of persons treated as permanent residents of the State, conferring on permanent residents any special rights and privileges or imposing upon other persons any restrictions as respects employment in the State Government, acquisition of immovable property in the State, settlement in the State or right to scholarship and other aids granted by the State.”

It is surprising that the Judges hold such an opinion about Article 35A, which essentially is the result of the Executive usurping powers of the Legislative. Regardless, the fact of the matter is that Article 35A has derogated and diminished the rights, some fundamental, others constitutional, of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. A few of such curbs and curtailment pertain to rights of other backward castes; women’s inheritance rights; right to education; etc.

I will dwell deeper on this issue of impact of Article 35A on the rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir in a separate article.

Unbridled Presidential Powers
10.   In Para 36, the Judges have concluded that:

”...the President under Article 370(1) is conferred with power to extend any provision of the Constitution to the State with such exceptions and modifications‖ as the President may deem fit subject to consultation or concurrence with the State Government and that such power would include one to amend or alter the provision to be applied, delete or omit part of it, or make additions to the Provisions proposed to be applied to the State.”

Clearly, entrusting the President with such sweeping powers, in contravention of all accepted norms of creating checks and balances within government through the “separation of powers” among the branches of the state, is a mockery of the founding principles of a democratic republic. Be as it may, the risk of vesting the President with such extensive discretionary power is that the political discourse for the State could be easily hijacked, more so if it were a weak or ineffective President. Worse, it could lead to an autocratic or authoritarian regime in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Further, as has been held by the Apex Court in the Puranlal Lakhanpal case (AIR 1961 SC 1519), which the Judges have also cited: “...the object behind enacting Article 370 (1) was to recognise the special position of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to provide for that special position by giving power to the President to apply the provisions of the Constitution to that State with such exceptions and modifications as the President might by order specify.”

So then, while admitting that Article 370 recognises the special position of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as held in the Puranlal Lakhanpal judgment, it is pertinent to note that no judgment of that Supreme Court has concurred with the view that Article 370 is a permanent feature of the Constitution of India. 

Indeed, it is high time the people of Jammu and Kashmir initiated an honest dialogue and made an objective attempt to assess whether Article 370 has truly furthered the interests of the State. If the conclusion is that Article 370 has had a deleterious, detrimental effect on the State of Jammu and Kashmir and its people, then the State and Union should work towards either its amendment or its abrogation. Blindly clinging on to Article 370 because of political pressures or perverse propaganda serves neither the interests of the State of Jammu & Kashmir nor the Union of India.

The Hon’ble Judges Janak Raj Kotwal and Hasnain Massodi have surely used convoluted logic, perhaps out of ignorance, if not incompetence, to conclude that the said Article is “beyond amendment, repeal or abrogation.”  It appears that, in the process of making invalid, inaccurate, inappropriate and mostly untenable arguments, they have extensively adopted a policy, intentionally or otherwise, of suppressio veri, suggestio falsi.


Thursday, June 4, 2015

Why Religious Institutions Should be Wary of the Gold Monetisation Scheme

The draft “Gold Monetisation Scheme”, announced by the Finance Ministry, is aimed at mobilizing gold holdings of households and institutions. The objective is to productively deploy hitherto idle, privately-held gold assets and valuables. In an earlier post, I had pointed out twenty grey areas in the draft scheme. Despite quite a few lacunae and loopholes, it is undeniable that the scheme makes tremendous economic sense. Gold monetisation will reduce the import burden and drive economic growth.
 

Religious endowments and charitable institutions― regardless of denomination― do come under the ambit of the scheme. Religious trusts and charities can open gold deposit accounts and earn interest under the scheme. The gold offerings of devotees so monetized will help in the nation building process.
 

So then, should our temples, mosques and churches look to monetize gold jewelry, artifacts, ornaments and other movable properties? What are the legal, political and constitutional ramifications of utilising such valuables for productive purposes?
 

I will look to answer the questions from the perspective of Hindu temples and then generalise.

Religious Activities under the Constitution

As is well known, India is a sovereign democratic republic that adheres to socialist and secular principles. With socialism ingrained in the Constitution, India― a welfare state― is duty-bound to disperse benefits and burdens equitably in society. The Supreme Court has held in the D.S. Nakara case (AIR 1983 SC 130) that the basic framework of socialism is to "...eliminate inequality of income, status and standard of life," and "to end poverty, ignorance, disease and inequality of opportunity." Hence, the socialistic tenets enshrined in the Constitution encourage the monetisation of not just gold, but all assets (including land and buildings) that religious entities and establishments own and possess.
 

In an earlier post, I had elaborated on the connotation of secularism under the Indian Constitution. Secularism― a basic feature of the Constitution, as held in the Kesavananda Bharti case (AIR 1973 SC 146)― is essentially the separation of state from religion. In other words, the state has no religion; it can neither get involved in religious affairs nor interfere with religious freedom. Therefore, any attempt or opportunity for monetising assets and properties cannot be confined to a particular sect, class, religion or community.
 

As is well known, sovereignty is about the supreme power of law-making. While recognizing that the State cannot intervene in religious matters of its citizens, the Constitution does confer wide legislative powers on the State. Surely there can be no State within a State. Consequently, it is constitutionally valid for the secular Indian State to regulate religious activities. The neutrality of the State towards religion though cannot be violated― as held in the SR Bommai case (AIR 1994 SC 1918). Neutrality would clearly imply that the State cannot do anything which discriminates in favour of or against a particular religion. Any such discrimination would infringe upon Article 25(1), which bestows the fundamental right to ‘freely practise, profess and propagate religion’, when read with the rights to ‘equality before the law and equal protection of the laws’ under Article 14 of the Constitution.
 

The Constitution originally provided for the fundamental right to property under Article 31, which was repealed and made a constitutional right under Article 300-A. Such power of government to take private property for public use is enjoyed by the State under the Doctrine of Eminent Domain. Surely the hand that giveth can be hand that taketh too.
 

Legal Aspects of Property Belonging to Religious Entities

A religious endowment is a dedication of property, which has for its object, establishment, maintenance or worship of an idol, deity or any other object or purpose subservient to religion. The Supreme Court has held in the Yogendra Nath Naskar case (AIR 1969 SC 1089) that the Hindu idol is “a juristic entity capable of holding property and of being taxed through its shebaits who are entrusted with the possession and management of its property...the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the particular purpose...it can figure as a legal person and... the dedicated property vests in it.”
 

Any property gifted, offered or bequeathed to a deity vests in that deity; all such property offered to a deity is irrevocable. Any mahant, shebait, dharmakarta, muttwalli, muntazim or mathadipati looking after the affairs of the endowment enjoys limited powers of alienation. The status of such religious trusteeship is similar to that of a manager or guardian of an infant heir. Hence, the property vested in a Hindu deity or idol is inalienable, except in cases of unavoidable necessity and absolute exigency. Put differently, the power of alienation must be exercised for purposes of defence and not of aggrandizement.
 

Any devotee or worshiper who makes an offering to the deity of a temple does so as an expression of the right to practise, profess and propagate religion under Article 25. The purpose of the offering is religious in nature. The administrators of and the performers of worship (e.g., archakas, pujaris, purohits, etc.) at the temple are in a position of trust. They have a fiduciary responsibility and are duty bound to utilise the offerings made and properties bequeathed by devotees for propagation of the faith that the deity represents, besides the denomination of Hinduism that the deity is belongs to. This obligation applies even in cases where the temple is administered by government under appropriate enactments.
 

Some specific nuances or variations notwithstanding, the above legal ties or bonds― connecting a devotee and his offerings with the religious purpose and the beneficiary of his devotion― apply universally regardless of the deity, divinity or denomination. Any legislative attempt to alter this sacred relationship between the divine and the devoted violates the Constitution of India.
 

Religious Gold Monetisation

How does all this translate in the context of gold monetisation?
 

Well, any religious institution― Hindu or otherwise― has no legal impediments per se with regard to the deposit of temple gold under the Gold Monetisation Scheme, provided there is no alienation of such deposited gold. Yet, participation in the scheme has to be voluntary and subject entirely or exclusively to the discretion of the trustees, administrators or religious heads of the entities and endowments. The usufructs of the deposit though should be used ONLY for the purpose for which the religious institution exists. 

Nevertheless, foolproof measures must be in place to ensure the safety, sanctity and security of the gold deposited is not compromised. Suitable mechanisms must also be worked into the initiative to ensure that ancient coins and antique jewelry are not deposited, for such artifacts are likely to be priceless as collector items. Their market prices are typically much higher than the equivalent gold value.
 

A guarantee, sovereign or otherwise, is necessarily needed too to ensure that the gold so deposited neither depreciates in value nor gets diminished in purity or quantity. Besides, adequate deposit insurance against all risks (including, but not limited to, insolvency of banks, fluctuations of gold prices, etc.) must be provided for all gold deposits of religious institutions under the gold monetisation scheme.
 

Typical contractual clauses that restrict liability of banks towards the deposits, such as force majeure, must be waived under the gold deposit scheme. The scheme has to be made suitably watertight to protect deposits against losses and safeguard the interests of religious institutions.
 

Conclusions

Monetisation of gold of religious establishments not only has legal angles to it, but also entails deeply emotional elements. Hence, there is a need for complete openness and transparency. The Reserve Bank of India has to make public the contractual terms under which religious institutions would be required to deposit gold.
 

Religious entities under government control, such as those administered by the Endowments Department, must necessarily notify / publicly announce the details of all endeavours to deposit gold. Gold articles and artifacts that government-managed religious institutions plan to deposit with banks must be subject to public scrutiny. As a general rule, no gold item dating back more than 25 years should be accepted in deposit, because all articles get melted and converted to bullion. 
 

It must be remembered that all gold belonging to religious institutions is sacred. The title and ownership of the gold vests in the deity or divine embodiment/manifestation, which is the beneficiary of the offering made. Hence, the government has an obligation to ensure that there are appropriate checks and balances introduced in the scheme to eliminate loot of the wealth by fraudsters and scamsters.
 

Forewarned is forearmed! Indeed, we need to be extra vigilant with regards to any and every attempt to monetize any of the "divine gold".