Showing posts with label Apex Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Apex Court. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 26, 2019

THE BIG LIE CALLED “RAFALE SCAM”

Adolf Hitler coined the term “groβe lüge” (“Big Lie” in German). The colossal falsehood in a 'Big Lie' makes it believable, because no one would think that the 'truth could be distorted so much and so preposterously'. Hitler went on to say: “The greater the lie, the easier (it is) to believe it.” Then again, repeating a 'big lie' often enough (to paraphrase Goebbels), makes people believe it!


The Nazis used the 'big lie' effectively, albeit cunningly, as a propaganda technique to promote bigotry and anti-semitism during the 1930s and 1940s. Looking at all the brouhaha raised over the “Rafale Deal”, it appears the Congress too has taken a leaf out of the Fascist book.


No Specific Scam Value

First things first. Let us start with the a priori assumption that there indeed is a scam. If so, the question that begs to be asked is: “What is the estimated value of the alleged scam?”

Well, Sri Rahul Gandhi has extensively tweeted about the deal over the last year or so. In those tweets he has variously specified the scam value, which has ranged from Rs.22,000 to Rs.130,000 crores. The tweets put the scam at the average of about Rs.65,000 crores.
So, the first million dollar question: How can the scam amount exceed Rs.59,000― the entire Rafale deal value for 36 fighters in flyaway condition?

Clearly, it is a case of not “notional”, but “confusional losses”.

No Quid Pro Quo

Nonetheless, the acquisition of Rafale fighters is through an Indo-French governmental contract. So then, who has bribed whom? Is Sri Gandhi insinuating that Government of India paid off officials in the French Government? Or, did the French Government offer bribes to bag the deal? If so, who were the beneficiaries of the kickbacks? Either hypothesis is atrociously ludicrous and in equal measure too, for, there is no trace of either any money trail or any wrongful gain/loss.

The allegation is that the ADAG is a beneficiary by virtue of being an offset partner. That theory too is replete in absurdity...um, and hilarity! I mean, where is the proof of kickbacks paid by the French Government to Anil Ambani? Oh, if the offset partnership between Dassault and ADAG is supposedly the smoking gun evidence, then there are 59 other partners vying for the spoils. Besides, there are apparently over 20 other partnerships on the anvil being hammered by the three main manufacturers of the Rafale fighter, namely, Dassault, Safran and Thales.

Offset Business Partnerships

The offset partners competing for about Rs.21,000 crores of business are all well known, legitimate entities in the Indian aerospace sector and related industrial landscape. Many of the selected partners are listed companies; others are Indian subsidiaries of multinational corporations; and, a few are public sector undertakings and their subsidiaries.

On top, Dassault is contractually bound to award offset contracts worth Rs.9,000 crores to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
The deal will surely revitalise the Indian aerospace industry.

Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) Selection

As is well-known, six companies, namely, Boeing (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet); Dassault Aviation (Rafale); EADS (Eurofighter Typhoon); Lockheed Martin (F-16 Fighting Falcon); Russian Aircraft (MiG-35); and Saab Group (JAS 39 Gripen), were in the fray for supplying MRCA aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF). None of these six aircraft qualified in toto on the stringent Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (ASQR) specifications. Thereafter, the IAF short-listed the Eurofighter Typhoon and Rafale based on laboratory presentations and rejected the other fighter aircraft.
Finally the Rafale was selected with India-specific enhancements. Then the Government of India, that is, the UPA-II led by the Congress Party, carried out exclusive negotiations with Dassault. Shouldn't too eye-brows be raised then about this process? Why were negotiations not carried out with Eurofighter Typhoon? And, the obvious coup de grâce:

Did any UPA functionaries receive kickbacks for selecting the Rafale? Hope we get some answers.

Bofors Bribery Scandal

In the 1980s, teams of the Indian Army evaluated the field howitzers of four manufacturers (from United Kingdom, France, Austria and Sweden). The Swedish gun fared poorly in field trials, firing only upto a distance in the 11-21 km range, against the technical specification of 30 km. Hence, in the three reports submitted, the Bofors 155mm Howitzers was ranked “Second”, at best, and, “Fourth/Last”, at worst, among the contenders.
In spite of the outright rejection, the then Defence Minister, Sri. R. Venkataraman chose Bofors.

Why?

Well...the Bofors Deal (unlike the instant Rafale Purchase) involved middlemen. On top, a whistleblower inside Bofors revealed details of the kickbacks amounting to Rs.64 crores. Later, information about the money trail too emerged (leading to Swiss bank accounts).

Bungled Investigation and Prosecution

Despite the mountain of evidence, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) botched up investigations badly. Deliberately so, as it seems!

Not only the registration of FIR, but also submission of rogatories were delayed. An Italian businessman and the main Accused in the bribery scandal, Quattrocchi was allowed to escape to Malaysia. Later, the Interpol Red Corner Notice against him was later withdrawn. Further, Quattrocchi's bank account in London was allowed to be de-frozen and a weak case for his extradition was made out in Argentinian Courts. Neither was the Argentinian verdict in the extradition proceedings nor the judgment of the Delhi High Court in 2004 appealed on.

Rafale Deal: A Complete Contrast

The Rafale acquisition is poles apart from the Bofors purchase! The direct involvement of Government of India sans middlemen; lack of any money trail; procurement of the aircraft rated numero uno; the hard bargain struck on offset credits; absence of any credible whistle-blower...all make the Rafale deal clean as a whistle!

Conclusion: #NoRafaleScam

Thus, Sri. Rahul Gandhi's claims of a scam seem like a “red herring” engulfed in smoke and mirrors! And, that smoke is devoid of not only fire, but also firewood! No wonder then that the Hon'ble Supreme Court (SC) and the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have given the purchase clean chits. Therefore, accusations of a scam in the Rafale acquisition is a figment of imagination, or rather, politically-motivated imputation!

Every time Sri Gandhi alleges a scam, he implies that all of Prime Minister's Office, Apex Court, Ministry of Defence, CAG, IAF, Defence Acquisition Council, Indian Negotiating Team (of Rafale), etc., are all lying. Hence, the more he flogs the dead horse of a scam, the more foolish, hollow and sinister he looks and sounds!

But then, as Machiavelli put it, “politics have no relation to morals”. 


Thursday, April 5, 2018

GOVERNMENT HATAO; TEMPLE BACHAO!


Nandi Betta, a hill about 60 kilometers from Bengaluru, features an ancient fort dating back to the Ganga period.
Atop the hill is the Yoga Nandīśwara Temple built by the Cholas about thousand years ago. In 2003, the government ensnared this temple into its administrative control under the Karnataka Endowments Act.
A visit to this beautiful shrine reveals a sad saga of wanton neglect and gross mismanagement. Rotting doors, ill-maintained precincts, structural dilapidation, missing kalaśa atop the śikara, majestic pillars callously plastered with cement concrete…the list is endless! A grand showpiece of past glory is a shameful blot of present ruin.
Courtesy: An apathetic, incompetent government; its negligent functionaries and inadequacy of resources.
The moot point: Why does our State meddle with religious affairs despite its secular credentials? Why is our meddlesome government entangled in administering only Hindu temples?
The simple answer: greedy, shoddy government clubbed with a lax, careless community!
Regulation of Religion in India
The Indian Rebellion of 1857 was a watershed moment in the independence struggle. Simmering skepticism over British rule and raging resentment against their policies culminated in the insurrection. The final spark for the rebellion was the use, as rumored, of beef and pork tallow to grease Enfield rifle cartridges. The British eventually quelled the mutiny. The colonial regime though learned its lessoninterference in religious affairs and indigenous traditions had to be minimal in the sub-continent.
Till the mid-1800s, regulations provided for general superintendence of Hindu temple endowments. The Board of Revenue was authorised to appoint local agents for achieving objects of endowments. In the aftermath of the sepoy revolt, the British introduced a new Act in 1863 to relinquish direct administration and provide for supervision of temples by local committees. In effect, an arm’s length philosophy was adopted for regulating religion.
The 1863 legislation had no in-built mechanism for enforcing orders; hence, the British enacted laws in 1920s for supervisory control of Hindu religious and charitable endowments in presidency towns. The erstwhile princely State of Mysore too promulgated an enactment in 1914 for regulating Hindu endowments. The Act was amended in 1927 to extend control over all religious institutions, including masjids, dargahs, etc. Indeed the endowment laws applied equally to all religions in British Raj.
Origins of the Karnataka Enactment
State boundaries were redrawn to create modern Karnataka in 1956. Yet, multiple, commendably-secular British-era endowment laws continued to be prevalent in the State. These statutes— such as: the Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 1927; the Hyderabad Endowment Regulations, 1349 Fasli; and, the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 provided for the registration and supervision of all public trusts, charitable endowments and religious institutions, including temple, maha, waqf, church, synagogue and agiary.
In its 1980 Admar Mutt judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court severely criticised the absence of a comprehensive legislation encompassing all temples and mutts in the reorganized State of Karnataka. This paved the way for a unified legislation to uniformly regulate religious institutions.
Unfortunately though, the government— initially, Śri JH Patel’s Janata Dal and later, Śri SM Krishna’s Congress governments— destroyed the secular fabric of previous legislations under the garb of unifying endowments laws of Karnataka. Thus, the Karnataka Hindu Religious & Charitable Institutions Act, 1997 was enacted and notified for targeted regulation of only Hindu temples and religious institutions.
Constitutionality of the Enactment
The 1997 Act excludes Hindu mutts and Sikh, Jain and Buddhist institutions from its ambit. The discrimination aside, it also enables the diversion of common pool fund contributions of Hindu temples for the benefit of other religions. Hence, on judicial challenge (Sahasra Lingeshwara case), the High Court of Karnataka found the Act was arbitrary, unreasonable, unjustifiable; violative of Articles 14, 25 and 26. Hence, it was declared unconstitutional!
The State then constituted a high-powered committee under Justice Rama Jois to suggest suitable amendments for circumventing the unconstitutionality. The stated object was to strengthen Hindu institutions by regulating 'secular and pecuniary matters', facilitating 'good and efficient administration' and protecting 'religious autonomy'.
Flawless rationale! The exercise of sovereign power to regulate any religious institution is indeed kosher.
But, administration?
Absolutely not!
Legislative Discrimination and Arbitrariness
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held (in Gopalakrishnan Nair case) that the Constitution prohibits the establishment of a theocratic State. The government is proscribed from constituting an atheist society and identifying itself with or favouring any one religion. It clarified that secularism is about affording “equal status of all religions without any preference…or discrimination…” a view reiterated in the Bal Patil Judgment too, wherein it also proclaimed that religious, cultural and educational rights of all people, enshrined in Articles 25 to 30, must be protected. The ideal of a democratic society should be the elimination of majority and minority and forward and backward classes.
When viewed from the prism of the above precedents, any legislation that provides for administrative control, besides regulation, of only Hindu institutions is discriminatory. The exclusion of other religions is inherently communal, for it implies that non-Hindu religious institutions are never mismanaged.
The 1997 Karnataka Act curtails the rights of Hindus only; it transgresses unjustifiably the equal entitlement to freedom of conscience afforded to all under the Constitution.
Hence, the unjust act must be assailed vigorously; and, with vehemence, right?
Fundamental Right to Equality
Under Indian laws Hindu deities are juristic persons— so too, the Guru Granth Sahib— capable of holding property, receiving income, suing and being sued in court. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held (Basheshar Nath and Chiranjit Chowdhuri cases) that 'fundamental rights' are guaranteed to all; and, that the rights to 'equality before law' and 'equal protection of laws' enure to the benefit of all persons, citizens and non-citizens.
The State Trading Corporation (STC) judgment echoes the view that the Constitution contra-distinguishes rights to be enjoyed by all, “irrespective of whether they were citizens or aliens, or…natural…or juristic persons...”
It was clarified in the Budhan Choudhry judgment that Article 14 forbids class legislation, but not reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentia for legislation. The classification must relate rationally to the object of the statute though, for "the reason for a law ceasing, the law itself ceases.”
Hence, if alleged, legislative discrimination must be properly justified. As observed in the Bachan Singh case: “‘rule of law’…permeates the Indian Constitution…arbitrariness or unreasonableness…is denial of rule of law.”
Faith, Equality and Secularism
The interpretation espoused in the STC case shows the “right to equality” applies to artificial, juristic entities such as Hindu deities. Hence, any legislation that abridges or diminishes the fundamental rights of any person, be it the presiding deity of a temple, or its devotees, would be unconstitutional.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has declared (Ismail Faruqui case) that “secularism is one facet of…equality” All religions and religious communities must be preserved, protected and placed on par. The expression ‘any person’ in Article 14 has been construed (TMA Pai judgment) to mean similarly situated persons. It has also been held (SR Bommai case) that religion of a person 'is immaterial'; all are equal and entitled to be treated equally.
This secular duty of upholding the right to equality of all persons extends to holding all juristic entities and artificial persons on an equal pedestal regardless of religious color, spiritual flavor or philosophical tenor.
The moot point is: Can a secular government differentially favor faiths or selectively curtail rights of deities associated therewith?
Certainly not!
Yet, Hindu institutions of all hues have been singled out for State intervention. Similar laws do not exist for empowering direct State involvement in the affairs churches, mosques, etc.
And, that surely is discriminatory, no matter how you slice and dice it!
Right to Propagate Religion
A secular state is an areligious, irreligious or non-religious state; it has no inherent right to “manage religious affairs” or “administer Hindu temples”. The Apex Court has observed (AVKV Temple case) that the right to manage temples or endowments is “not integral to religion or religious practice.”
So, a duty is imposed on the State to intervene in the event of mismanagement of religious affairs.
In the landmark Shirur Mutt case, the Supreme Court ruled that propagation of belief is protected, regardless of whether it “takes place in a church or monastery or…temple or parlor meeting.” In other judgments too (Govindlalji and Ratilal Gandhi cases) it has reiterated that the freedom to practice rituals; manage religious affairs; and, administer property lawfully are guaranteed, fundamental rights. Legislation cannot take away those rights, which are neither absolute nor unfettered though.
Yet, state meddling in administrative affairs of Hindu temples transgresses rights. It depletes Hindu ability to retain their ‘devoted faithful’, which is intrinsic to the temple ecosystem and pivotal for propagating Hindu dharma.
Thus, the Constitution does not contemplate the governance of religious practices, subject to public order, health and morality. It does permit the regulation of religious activities, which are economic or political in character.
Regulation, though, does NOT mean administration!
Real Meaning of Denomination
The Hon’ble Apex Court relied (Shirur Mutt case) on the Oxford Dictionary to equate ‘denomination’ with Hindu mutt/maha (based on sampradāya), which is designated by a distinctive name, has a common faith and spiritual organisation. The Karnataka Endowments Act too describes ‘Hindu Religious Denomination’ in like terms.
So, what is a ‘denomination’?
Dictionaries define it as 'branch of any religion' and 'religious organization whose congregations are united in adherence to distinctive beliefs (about God) and practices'. A Christian denomination is an ecclesiastical order with a structured theological organisation; associated hierarchy of local churches and comprised of congregations of faithful members. It has distinctive procedures for traditions, such as, ordination, laicization, defrocking, induction (membership) into the “covenant community”, transfer of affiliation, repentance, profession of faith, confession/acceptance of and commitment to Lord Jesus, baptism, remission of sins, sanctification, etc.
A new denomination is created when some members reject the spiritual leadership of a church/group due to doctrinal dissent or immoral practices. The breakup is typically nominal, and not schismatic (refuted by some groups), since both factions stay within Christianity despite disparate labels, beliefs and practices.
Thus, the Christian denomination is an identifier for affiliation by membership to an organised school of thought, which consists of well-defined ‘procedural mechanisms’ and ‘command and control structure, either central or decentralised’. On top, there is a 1:1 relationship between devotee (the member) and denomination.
Hindu Denomination A Misnomer?
Hinduism has no organisational hierarchy; ecclesiastical order; governing body or central authority. Neither is there a prophet or binding holy book. Unlike monotheistic, Abrahamic religions, Hinduism affords freedom on theisticpolytheistic, pantheistic, monistic, or atheistic beliefs. Within its open, diffuse and diverse structure, spirituality in Hinduism is a matter of personal faith, individual experience and philosophical discovery of Divinity and individual devotion to His manifestations or embodiments.
Swami Harshānanda’s “Encyclopedia of Hinduism” explains 'sampradāya' literally as: “that which is given or handed over (in succession)” from a guru/teacher to śiśya(s)/disciple(s). Sanskrit-English dictionaries unanimously interpret the term as referring to bodies of founder-teachers and their disciples. It connotes traditional doctrine of knowledge; or, conventional teaching in arts, sciences or religion; or, established belief, custom, practice or usage.
Monier Williams though adds the connotation of ‘sect’ or ‘class of people’ in his lexicon perhaps the seminal reason for importing an extrinsic term like ‘denomination’ into Hinduism. In reality, sampradāya and denomination are like chalk and cheese; yet, equating the two is force-fitting of the dhārmic narrative into a western paradigm.
Every maha/mutt typically has a definitive parampara (tradition); darśaa (philosophical doctrine); mārga (path); and, associated sampradāya-based monastic order and lineage. Hence, deeming maha (so too āśrama) to be the Hindu-equivalent of the alien, Christian concept of 'denomination' is flawed.
Hindu Temples and Denominations
If the Shirur Mutt interpretation of ‘denomination’ is the judicial gold standard, then every Hindu devālaya (literally, abode of the Almighty) or temple constitutes a religious denomination. So it can be tenably argued.
The argument is simple.
The temple is a religious institution based on a distinctive belief, conforming to specific vāstu-, śilpa- and sthāpatya-śāstras; the presiding Deity is consecrated based upon spiritual affiliation to a definite sampradāya. Distinctive veda and āgama dictate the religious practices rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship catering to the needs of and providing succor to congregated devotees.
Given the religious fabric and devotional constructs of Hinduism, classifications exist socially through birth-based jāti (caste) and theoretically through vara (class). Every Hindu owes allegiance to numerous temples and seeks solace in presiding Deities, regardless of jāti, vara, dharma, sampradāya and parampara. For example, the Manjunātheśwara Temple in Dharmasthaa, Karnataka has Jain dharmādhikāris administering the temple as its hereditary trustees and vaiśnava archakās worshiping the mūrti of Śiva therein.
Ergo, endowment laws must be recalibrated to hold every Hindu temple as a ‘denomination’ for conferring rights.
Right to Maintain Religious Institutions
Article 26 bestows the fundamental right to “establish and maintain” religious and charitable institutions on every denomination. Indeed, administration is integral to [if not synonymous] maintenance of an institution. The Karnataka High Court ruled (Mukundaraya Shenoy case) that a law, which takes away administrative rights from a religious denomination altogether and vests them in another authority, would violate Article 26. The Orissa High Court too expressed (Ram Chandra Deb case) similar sentiments; it pronounced that if Zoroastrians are a separate religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26, then so too are all Hindus.
Further, the State cannot discriminate between Hindu denominational and institutional temples. To wit, a maha is as much a religious institution as a devālaya is a religious denomination and vice-versa.
Further, Article 25(2) empowers the State to regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice. But, 'administrative control' of temple activities, secular or religious, cannot be deemed to be 'regulation or restriction' of such activities. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of Pannalal Pitti case perhaps deserves a revisit.
Administration, not just superintendence, of Hindu shrines by the State abridges, if not abrogate, the religious rights of Hindus. It impinges on the fundamental right of equality of all Hindu persons. Regulation of properties of only Hindu Deities is arbitrary and unreasonable; it contravenes judgments in Bal Patil and other cases.
Governmental Takeover of Hindu Temples
The right to property is not a fundamental, but a constitutional right. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held (Elphinstone Mills and other cases) the State is empowered to take over management of any property for a limited period, not indefinitely. But, the takeover must objectively bein public interest or…to secure proper management…”
The Karnataka statutes and rules stipulate no objective method for ascertaining financial irregularity and/or managerial lacunae. The ‘takeover’ of about 35,000 Hindu religious institutions in Karnataka has been effected: (a) without adverse complaints, not to mention flimsy, frivolous grounds; (b) often on subjective report of the competent authority; and, (b) without specifying the period of takeover.
Thus, the governmental exercise ad infinitum of administrative control over Hindu places of worship is vitiated by illegality a fraudulent affront to the dignity the Constitution.
Primary functions of government are reduction of class disparities and enhancement of socio-economic conditions of its people through good governance and transparent administration. Entanglement in the management of places of worship is contrary to secular tenets. Such takeover must be only in public interest, provided there is objective evidence of maladministration as a condition precedent. Further, while exercising regulatory power over various faiths, religions and denominations, the State is duty-bound to be neutral and impartial.
However, that mandate has been deviously hijacked to usurp the fundamental rights of only Hindus.
Autonomous Temple Administration
The Hon’ble Apex Court (Sabayanagar Temple case) has held that when government acquires a temple, it must hand management back after remedying the evil. Power to regulate does not empower superseding administration indefinitely. Direct engagement of a secular government in the administrative affairssecular’, ‘pecuniary’ or ‘religious of religious institutions infringes the fundamental rights of devotees.
Every temple ecosystem entails activities around three realms, namely: the ādhibhautika, ādhidaivika and ādiatmika, which respectively correspond to the ‘physical & financial’, ‘ritual & cultural’ and ‘spiritual & philosophical’ relationships with Divinity.
Regulation should be restricted to the ādhibhautika realm, that is, only the physical and financial aspects of the temple. It must be arm’s length superintendence, for the core objects of every temple is practice and propagation of religion. All incidental activities are auxiliary to and intertwined with those main objects.
Arguably no temple activity is purely non-religious, or exclusively secular, in nature.
Conclusions
The ultra vires administration of Hindu temples aside, legislative loopholes give ample opportunity for unabashed, unabated exploitation. The concomitant loot, larceny and largesse by the instrumentality of the State has to end.
The fence eating the crop must stop! The Karnataka Endowments Act having only Hindu institutions under its purview is an ill-conceived, politically-motivated move a Trojan for trampling upon the rights of Hindus.
Thus, an urgent need exists for affording greater autonomy to Hindu temples. The preservation of pluralistic society and a secular, democratic State is at stake!
The million-dollar question: Will government show spine in coming up with a pan-religion legislation?
Your guess is as good as mine!

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

SIBALISMS AND THE SUPREME ART OF DUPLICITOUS ARGUMENTATION

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “Syllogism” as “a subtle, specious or crafty argument.” Such arguments are laced with fallacious or sophistic reasoning. Senior Congress leader and learned lawyer, Mr. Kapil Sibal used all his legal acumen, erudition and craftiness to extend arguments in the “triple-talaq” hearings before the Supreme Court of India. His arguments were so over-the-top, silly and syllogistic, that I think we need to coin “Sibalism” as a new word to describe such fallacies.
A compilation of the Top-14 Sibalisms (in my humble opinion) brought out during the triple-talaq arguments follows. I have named and explained the fallacy used in the learned counsel’s reasoning. Hope the list serves as a “1-on-1 Guide of Sibalisms”!
[Note: I have relied on media reports of Mr. Sibal’s remarks to prepare this list.]
1.    On May 11, 2017, Mr. Sibal, Counsel for the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), told the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
“Triple talaq is a non-issue, as no prudent Muslim would wake up one fine morning and say 'talaq, talaq and talaq'.”
This is a ludicrous argument extended, a quintessential “Sibalism”. Not only does he imply that imprudent Muslim men do pronounce triple-talaq, but he also ignores the possibility of its abuse. Interestingly, the ambiguity/ambivalence towards gender in the sentence construction makes it appear as if Muslim women too have the right to practice it. The attempt is to downplay the seriousness of the issue and attempt legitimizing the practice. The classic “HASTY GENERALISATION” fallacy here is a tenuous inference on Triple Talaq based on an observation about a section of Muslims, namely, those who are prudent.
2.    On May 16, 2017, the Learned Counsel is report to have stated:
“The point is once you start interfering in it, where do you go? ...Consequences of this are enormous…We can’t even imagine the consequences”.
The “fear mongering” in the argument is typical of the “SLIPPERY SLOPE” fallacy, wherein Mr. Sibal has warned of the small first step of the Court “interfering in triple-talaq” could culminate in “significantly negative consequences”. Fortunately for us, the snowball effect though is not spelled out in black and white as a threat though. Thank God for small mercies!
3.    On the same day, that is, March 16, 2017, he posed in his submissions:
“Why is the Centre so keen to raise doubts about the constitutional morality of Muslims' faith in the 1400-year-old practice of triple talaq…Who is the government to say that triple-talaq, evolved through social and family norms, is “un-Islamic.”
It is a fact that many Islamic scholars believe that apostasy in or renunciation of Islam is punishable by death. Yet, Government (or, rather, the Constitution, to be precise) confers on all citizens the freedom to convert from one faith to another as a fundamental right. Then again, some Islamic theologians quote the Quran to incite Muslims into waging violent Jihad against non-Muslims (infidels). But, any such violence against other religions is proscribed under our Constitution. Passionate rhetoric aside, the Counsel’s attempt in his argument─ a great example of the “RED HERRING” fallacy─ is to divert attention from “constitutional validity” of triple-talaq to the unrelated issue of the powers of government to question “morality of faith” and “conformity of practice with religion.”
4.    Further, on the same day, he went on record to say:
"If I have faith that Lord Rama was born at Ayodhya, then it's a matter of faith and there is no question of constitutional morality. And why should court interfere? Similar is the case with triple talaq."
Courts indeed are seized of the matter on whether Ayodhya is the birthplace of Lord Rama. Be as it may, triple talaq is not a matter of faith, but of customary practice. Various practices (e.g., Dahi Handi, Jallikattu, entry of women into Haji Ali Dargah, etc.) have been repeatedly questioned by the courts. By citing the Ayodhya example, the “FALSE ANALOGY / EQUIVALENCE” fallacy here is to equate the “harmless belief about the birthplace of an avatar of God” with the “practice of triple-talaq, which infringes on gender equality”.
5.    He later proclaimed:
“Sharia is personal law and not subject to fundamental rights.” 
Some Islamic clerics claim stoning for adultery and murder is an integral, mandatory part of Sharia. So, should such inhumane punishment be incorporated in our justice system as a form of retribution and/or deterrence? Nevertheless, the linking of the two assertions, namely, “Sharia is personal law” and “it is not subject to fundamental rights,” in the same sentence is a logical jump, typical of a “NON-SEQUITUR” fallacy. Despite being personal law, Sharia can either be subject to fundamental rights or not.
Further, the argument is a “BEGGING THE QUESTION” fallacy, because it provides the conclusion that “Sharia is not subject to fundamental rights” as a premise.
6.    Then again, it is reported that he averred:
“There should be reform, but it has to come from within the community. Others cannot dictate to us how we should reform. Many customs and usages practised by the Hindus need to be kicked out. But leave it to the communities to do so.”
Oh boy, isn’t the validity of customs and usages tested on the touchstone of the Constitution day in and day out? I mean, haven’t degenerate practices like untouchability, devadasi, dowry prohibition, human sacrifice, etc. been stopped through judicial intervention and legislative reform? Nonetheless, the point here is who has decreed that “reform should come from within”? No statutory norm, constitutional tenet or governmental authority has endorsed or proclaimed such a mechanism for social and religious reform. Mr. Sibal’s anointment of community for driving reform is a fabricated source of authority. Consequently, he constitutes the “FALSE ATTRIBUTION” fallacy.
7.    On the same day, he also alleged as follows:
“When it comes to Hindu law, you protect all customs but when it comes to Muslims, you start raising questions over customs. Like when it comes to Dowry prohibition Act or Guardianship Act you follow customs and protect them…Hindu laws of divorce and succession are more discriminatory than triple talaq.” 
The argument comes across as a pathetic sob story no doubt. Nonetheless, invoking victimhood to gain sympathy is at the crux of the argument, which adopts a “yo-mama” kind of stance to deflect the discourse in the “APPEAL TO HYPOCRISY” fallacy. In this “Whataboutism” though, Mr. Sibal forgets that the Dowry Prohibition Act was actually enacted to counter the widespread practice of dowry in Hindu communities. Consequently, his allegation is wild and hollow
8.    Finally on March 16, 2017, Kapil Sibal noted as follows:
“Many women in the Hanafi School accept it as a valid form of divorce. Majority of the Prophet's companions considered it good…It may be bad, it may be sinful, but women accept it.”
Just because some women accept triple-talaq (indeed there is no evidential or objective basis for the claim) does not mean that it is acceptable to ALL Muslim women. Neither does it indicate that the practice does not infringe on fundamental rights of women enshrined in Articles 14 and 15. The farfetched claim of Mr. Sibal is characteristic of the “FALACY OF COMPOSITION”. Indeed, he has inferred that “all” Muslim women accept triple-talaq, based on the presumable fact that the practice is acceptable to “some” Muslim women.
9.    On the next day, that is, May 17, 2017, Mr. Kapil Sibal submitted as follows:
“Just because a certain section of people was aggrieved by their personal laws, does not warrant a case to seek reform in the area.” 
Preposterous! Mr. Sibal had only declared the previous day that reform must come from within the community. But, with regard to the voices of dissent/reform raised from within the Islamic community against triple-talaq, he makes a complete U-turn by stating that it does not warrant the seeking of reform! Such selective use of facts is referred to as “CARD-STACKING” fallacy.  
10. Further, on the same day he noted:
“The Muslim community is like small birds on which golden eagle preys…the community's nests must have the Supreme Court protection."
An absolute shocker of a remark! Those comments are appropriate for a political harangue, not an argument in a judicial proceeding. What has the size of a section of society got to do with the legality or otherwise of its practices. It is patently clear that Mr. Sibal’s attempt here is to take the focus away from the “lawfulness or unlawfulness of a customary practice” to the “protection of minorities and their interests” in this “STRAW MAN ARGUMENT”, yet another fallacy in his submissions before the Apex Court.  
11. Later on he observed:
“Only 0.4 per cent is practising it (triple-talaq) and this is not a ground to strike it down.”
Hey! Only 0.01 per cent of the population are murderers. So, should they all be given free passes and not punished? Laughable indeed! The attempt at trivializing the practice notwithstanding, it behooves Mr. Sibal to realise that just 0.4% of the population of 200-million Muslims is a humongous number. Indeed, triple-talaq affects almost a million people. It is as if Mr. Sibal is saying: “it cannot be imagined how a practice affecting only 0.4% of people can be struck down. Hence, it must not be struck down.” The reasoning in the statement indeed is anchored in the “APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE” fallacy.
12. Then during hearings on May 18, 2017, Mr. Sibal claimed as follows:
“If there is a consensus among Muslim scholars that it is a practice then it is valid.”
A cursory reading of the ludicrous assertion shows that in Mr. Sibal opinion Islamic experts should concur to declare triple-talaq as a “practice”. There is no need to qualify the practice as “valid”, mind you. That in and by itself is enough to accord validity or sacramental sanctity for the practice. Indeed there is no dispute that the practice exists. However, the controversy is about whether the practice violates the fundamental rights of Muslim women, as enshrined in our Constitution. Besides, there is no consensus per se among Muslim scholars (in particular, Shia clergymen have openly denounced the practice as sinful and invalid). Therefore, the argument falls under the “FALSE AUTHORITY” fallacy. Clearly, Muslim scholars cannot be the arbiters of constitutional validity of triple-talaq.
13. Furthermore, he declared:
“There is nothing in the Quran which says triple talaq is not valid.”
All that I can tell Mr. Sibal is that the Quran does not prohibit the use of loudspeakers for azaan either. Yet, the Apex Court has banned the practice since noise pollution in the wee hours of morning violates the fundamental rights of people in the neighborhood. Similarly there is nothing in the Quran that proves triple-talaq is valid either, for the practice began in 637 AD (as admitted by the learned Counsel himself) after the death of the Prophet. The ingenuity here lies in the implication that somehow there is divine sanction for the practice. Thus, the reasoning is logically flawed since it suffers from the “DIVINE FALLACY”.
14. On that day, he further pleaded: 
“Lots of thing are happening in the society which are protected by customs. The court is not here to decide what is a sinful practice in the world…We are talking about rule of law.”
Guess this is the most hilarious of them all. The Learned Counsel has tied himself into knots with his argument. Sure enough customary practices do exist in society, provided they are constitutional valid. Customs that are ultra vires the Constitution have been held to be unlawful. For example, restrictions on the entry of women to the Haji Ali Dargah have been done away with.  
Indeed it is the duty of the Court to decide whether a certain practice, sinful or kosher or otherwise, is in contravention of fundamental rights and the rule of law. It is admitted that triple-talaq is ‘sinful’. Consequently, the controversy before the Court is whether the customary practice in question curtails individual rights under the Constitution of India, the supreme law of the land. Mr. Sibal provides incomplete details/evidence in his statements. Consequently, his tenuous argument suffers from the “CHERRY PICKING” fallacy.
These “Sibalisms” may not be all. Perhaps more gems can be found if the entire transcript of Mr. Sibal’s arguments were to be scrutinised. And to tweak an expression borrowed from former Minister, Mr. Shashi Tharoor, the list does constitute a “farrago of deceptions, misinformation and outright lies”.

In the interest of not only gender justice, equality and dignity, but also constitutional supremacy, I am confident that the Apex Court will see through the fallacies in the arguments. Indeed, justice shall prevail eventually!

Jai Hind!