GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF HINDU TEMPLES IS ILLEGAL…AND DRACONIAN

The Emergency of 1975-77 was perhaps the darkest period in the post-independence history of India. The government’s clampdown on civil liberties and widespread abuse of human rights posed a serious challenge to the democratic values enshrined in the fabric of our Constitution.

Using its unfettered powers and a brute majority in Parliament, the Central Government headed by Smt. Indira Gandhi passed the 42^nd Amendment, which changed the perambulatory description of India from “sovereign democratic republic” to “sovereign, socialist, secular democratic republic”. The eminent jurist and constitutional expert, H.M. Seervai, severely criticised this ambiguous amendment inserted arbitrarily. However, the amendment survived judicial challenge and the term “secular” has since become an integral part of the Preamble.   

European Concept of “Secularism”

Many priests challenged the authority of the papacy in the 16^th Century. In his “Two-Governments Doctrine”, Martin Luther enunciated that the church should not exercise ‘worldly government’. The English philosopher, John Locke too argued that the state lacked authority in the realm of individual conscience. During the ‘Age of Reason’, Voltaire and other writers stressed anti-clericalism, which gained momentum in the French Revolution. This led to the concept of separating church from state. George Holyoake coined the term “secularism” in the 1850s to refer to such segregation.

Secularism, contrary to popular misconception in India, is not the opposite of communalism. Conceptually it entails indifference, perhaps even contemptuous irreverence, to religion in the affairs of the State. It requires government to exclude religion from its functions. But, in India the term has been misappropriated to justify the appeasement of religious minorities. The mollycoddling often disregards the sentiments of those affiliated to the majority religion. This insensitivity is most apparently manifest in state governments that are deeply entrenched in the administration ad infinitum of over 4 lakh Hindu temples within the country.

Indeed a complete mockery of the secular credentials enshrined in the Constitution!

Government Control of Hindu Temples

A Hindu temple is a space designed to bring devotees nearer to the Divine. Consecrated as the dwelling of the presiding God or deity, it is a place for prayer, worship, reverence and supplication to divinity. The structure of the temple is typically used for symbolic expression of the ideas and beliefs of Hinduism. The adoration of the deity gives Hindus solace and satisfaction.

Inscriptions and pillar edicts prove that Hindu temples also functioned as centres of community celebrations and training in fine arts, performing arts and architecture. Thus, temples not only provided spiritual succor to devotees, but also functioned as hubs of social, beneficent, charitable, cultural, educational and economic activity. They even served as forums for dispute resolution and dispensation of justice. In ancient times religious and charitable institutions were under the special protection of the ruling authority. The King, as the sovereign head of his state, discharged the duty of protecting temples and intervened as an arbiter in disputes.

In modern India, the Constitution provides for regulation and restriction of “any economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice.” This empowers government to institute regulatory measures for protecting interests of devotees, safeguarding temple assets, and intervening in the event of mismanagement.

Evidence, however, shows a brazen abdication of these duties, not to mention the refusal to abdicate control over temple affairs. The reluctance forced the Supreme Court to observe in its landmark Chidambaram Temple judgment:

“Even if the management of a temple is taken over to remedy the evil, the management must be handed over to the person concerned immediately after the evil stands remedied. Continuation thereafter would tantamount to usurpation of their proprietary rights or violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution… Supersession of rights of administration cannot be of a permanent enduring nature. Its life has to be reasonably fixed so as to be co-terminus with the removal of the consequences of maladministration… Power to regulate does not mean power to supersede the administration for indefinite period.”

The questions that beg to be asked then are: What happens if government relinquishes control over its temples? Who does the power to govern temples devolve onto? What safeguard and regulatory mechanisms are necessary for ensuring good governance?

Autonomous Temple Administration

A consensus no doubt exists over the need for government to end its involvement in the day-to-day affairs of temples. This is possible only if legislation enables the state to prevent mischief by functionaries, misappropriation of funds and mismanagement of affairs of temples. The law must also provide for timely intervention and time-bound exit of government from temples after irregularities or illegalities have been remedied.

Diversity within Hinduism— a large pantheon of Gods, besides multitude of sects and multiplicity of customs, beliefs, rituals, practices and worship forms— poses serious challenges to the enactment of any umbrella legislation. Imposing any diktat-driven, monolithic command-and-control forms of temple administration impractical.

Central Legislation: Need of the Hour

Hindu temples must reflect the ethos of Bharat and become cornerstones of a vibrant, progressive and resurgent nation, which is proud of its heritage, traditions and cultural roots. Temples can help people aspire for higher quality-of-life and inspire the pursuit of ‘dhārmic’ living. With appropriate societal interfaces temples can be transformed into hubs of socio-cultural activity.

Revitalising the temple ecosystem though calls for a decentralised system that entails rigorous regulatory oversight, while conferring autonomy in all operational matters, religious or otherwise. A robust system can ensure: (a) full withdrawal of state control over temples; (b) smooth transition of power to local communities; and, (c) effective and transparent administration of our holy shrines.

While rigid policy and compliance parameters may be imposed, temple administration mechanisms must be flexible. A phased transition approach can be framed for the transfer of management to local communities and mațhās based on sampradāyas.

If a “from-the-frying-pan-into-the-fire” scenario is to be avoided, a central comprehensive enactment for the regulation of Hindu temples is sine qua non. Indeed, we, the people of secular India, have a constitutional duty to ensure that the government is kept out of Hindu religious affairs!

The Diwali Fireworks Ban and the "Bike-Shed Effect"

The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order banning the sale of firecrackers for Diwali not only astounded, but also intrigued me. The intentions are surely noble. Indeed, atmospheric pollution and environmental degradation are serious challenges that all of humanity and not just the nation faces. No two thoughts about it.

Yet, the controversy surrounding the order precipitated enough curiosity for me to attempt estimating the impact of firecrackers during Diwali.

Dispassionate Assessment of Impact

Extrapolating the estimates of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of India in 2011, one would get to about 4,000 million metric tonnes of CO2-equivalent in 2017. This works out to roughly, say, 12 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent (MtCO2e) per day on weekdays and, say, 6 MtCO2e per day during weekends.

Now, it has also been estimated that fireworks during Diwali add about 60,000 tCO2e of GHG pollutants to the atmosphere. That is about 1% of the pan-India daily GHG emission over the weekends.

The National Capital Region of Delhi, with its population of about 26 million (or, 2% of India’s population), perhaps accounts for 10% of GHG emission on fireworks. A reasonable assumption since the per capita income levels of Delhi are much higher.

So the GHG emissions due to fireworks during Diwali in Delhi would be about 6,000 tCO2e. That works out to 0.1% of all India GHG emissions on the day of Diwali. Or, about 0.00015% of the annual GHG emissions of India. Or, about one in 667,000 parts of the annual air pollution of India.

That is an itsy-bitsy, teensy-weensy, miniscule drop in the mighty ocean of pollution!

The Easy Way

Of course, supporters of the Apex Court Orders would peddle the contrarian view that little drops make the mighty ocean. What they forget though is that it is more prudent to adopt a “Pareto Analysis” approach for identifying more effective ways of reducing pollution.

So, the tokenism and symbolism of it all is crystal clear. It reaffirms the “Parkinson’s Law of Triviality” (or, the “Bike-shed Effect”) mindset within us. Insofar as the air quality standards of Delhi are concerned, I dare say that the ban is a feeble attempt tantamount to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.

But then, such slipshod actions, knee-jerk reactions, sub-optimal solutions, half-baked conclusions have always been a bane besotting governance and dominating public discourse in the country. Guess banning other “24x7-polluting” lifestyle habits and “non-ecology-friendly” entertainment activities such as a/c multiplexes, carbonated drinks, television, amusement parks, etc., would have been deemed too extremist and hence taboo.

After all, we crave for the feeling that enough is being done to solve our problems.

Else, it becomes difficult to deal with our conscience and live with our guilt, right?

MUCH ADO ABOUT A FLAG?

"Is there any provision in the Constitution that prohibits a state from having a flag?” Sri. Siddaramaiah, Chief Minister of Karnataka is supposed to have asked.

The Chief Minister was indeed right is posing that question rhetorically. Strictly speaking, there is no reference to the issue of “State Flags”. It is just that he forgot that there is neither “any provision in the Constitution that permits a state to have a flag”.

So then, if the Constitution makes no express provision, can a State Government assume that it has the sanction/authority to declare a State flag?

The one-word, emphatic answer is: No!

Here’s why.

Constitutional Provisions and Interpretation

Firstly, let us start with the relevant portion of the only Article in the main Parts of the Constitution of India, namely, Article 51A that talks about "flags". It states:

51A. It shall be the duty of every citizen of India—

(a)   to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem;

(b)   …

A plain reading of this provision would make it clear that had the legislative intent been to endow various States with the power/authority to have “State Flags” and “State Anthems”, it would have surely mentioned it expressly in the list of “fundamental duties”. It is indeed inconceivable that Parliament, in its collective wisdom, would have, by implication, declared either that respecting State flags and anthems was not a duty of every citizen or that disrespecting the same was acceptable/permissible constitutionally. 

Further, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is a well-known Latin maxim, which is a principle used in statutory construction. It means: “when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned, others of the same class are excluded.” If “national and state flags and anthems” are considered as a class, then the exclusion of “state flags and anthems” from Article 51A clearly indicates that our law-makers never envisaged a scenario of states having official flags and anthems.

Indeed, a US Court, elaborating on “silence in statutory enactments” of Congress, aptly summarised as follows:

“…not every silence is pregnant. In some cases, Congress intends silence to rule out a particular statutory application, while in others Congress’ silence signifies merely an expectation that nothing more need be said in order to effectuate the relevant legislative objective. In still other instances, silence may reflect the fact that Congress has not considered an issue at all…”

Thus, the "silence" of our parliamentarians in Article 51A, ‘intentional’ or otherwise, can be only interpreted to imply states are either not to have or not expected to have their own “State flags and anthems”.

Further, if “rule of law” and “paramountcy of the Constitution” are to be upheld, interpretation of statute has to be strict and literal, particularly with regards to matters concerning our nationhood and national “unity and integrity”.

“Division of Powers”

Secondly, none of the lists, in the Seventh Schedule under Article 246– namely, the Union, State and Concurrent Lists– in the constitutional scheme of “Division of Powers between the Union and States”, makes reference to the vesting of law-making powers for flags. Yet, Item 97 of the Union List, expressly empowers the Union to make laws on “any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III…” i.e., the State and Concurrent Lists respectively.

Therefore, all “residual powers” under the Constitution lie with the Union, one of the reasons [which have been detailed in an earlier blog-post] why India is held to be “a unitary state with federal characteristics.”

What is in a flag?

Thirdly, some argue that since many social, religious, cultural and educational organisations are allowed to have their own flags, it is kosher for states too to have flags as a symbol of cultural and linguistic pride.

The analogy is flawed and untenable in more ways than one. To begin with, private outfits with flags are neither public agencies/entities nor constitutional bodies/authorities. On top, they are not funded by the state exchequer; neither are they part of government. Besides, flags of these private organisations do not get unfurled and hoisted at official events and functions.

Finally, others argue: “There is already a flag that is waved during Kannada Rajyotsava celebrations. So, what is the big deal if there is an official state flag?”

True. But then, hoisting the informal “red-yellow” Kannada flag on government premises is not mandatory. An official flag would have to be necessarily hoisted during official events and government functions. Other states too may want to designate official flags, which would raise questions about protocol to be followed.

And what if bigots and fringe elements in one state are tempted into burning flags of other states during protests and agitations? With law and order being a state subject, would showing disrespect to the flag of another state be permitted and held to be not an offence?

Given the inherent complexities, the official adoption of state flags would require an overarching law to be enacted at the centre. If our state government is so desperate to designate an official flag, then, it must necessarily seek to have Article 51A (if not the Seventh Schedule) of the Constitution amended by the Union.

Clearly, the idea of "official state flags" needs to be thought through thoroughly. There is the additional risk of linguistic and regional polarisation and divisiveness in the country arising out of any such move. A hasty decision can only hurt and haunt us in the future.

Closing Remarks

My grouse though against this move, divisive and dubious, if not devious, is as follows:

If successive state governments never felt it necessary to have a flag to further Kannada pride or cultural identity all these years, why is the issue being raked up now?

What added advantage does an “official flag” bring to us that the existing “unofficial flag” does not?

Is an official flag the only way to express linguistic pride and fervor?

Well, I do not think so. 

SIBALISMS AND THE SUPREME ART OF DUPLICITOUS ARGUMENTATION

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “Syllogism” as “a subtle, specious or crafty argument.” Such arguments are laced with fallacious or sophistic reasoning. Senior Congress leader and learned lawyer, Mr. Kapil Sibal used all his legal acumen, erudition and craftiness to extend arguments in the “triple-talaq” hearings before the Supreme Court of India. His arguments were so over-the-top, silly and syllogistic, that I think we need to coin “Sibalism” as a new word to describe such fallacies.

A compilation of the Top-14 Sibalisms (in my humble opinion) brought out during the triple-talaq arguments follows. I have named and explained the fallacy used in the learned counsel’s reasoning. Hope the list serves as a “1-on-1 Guide of Sibalisms”!

[Note: I have relied on media reports of Mr. Sibal’s remarks to prepare this list.]

1.    On May 11, 2017, Mr. Sibal, Counsel for the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), told the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

“Triple talaq is a non-issue, as no prudent Muslim would wake up one fine morning and say 'talaq, talaq and talaq'.”

This is a ludicrous argument extended, a quintessential “Sibalism”. Not only does he imply that imprudent Muslim men do pronounce triple-talaq, but he also ignores the possibility of its abuse. Interestingly, the ambiguity/ambivalence towards gender in the sentence construction makes it appear as if Muslim women too have the right to practice it. The attempt is to downplay the seriousness of the issue and attempt legitimizing the practice. The classic “HASTY GENERALISATION” fallacy here is a tenuous inference on Triple Talaq based on an observation about a section of Muslims, namely, those who are prudent.

2.    On May 16, 2017, the Learned Counsel is report to have stated:

“The point is once you start interfering in it, where do you go? ...Consequences of this are enormous…We can’t even imagine the consequences”.

The “fear mongering” in the argument is typical of the “SLIPPERY SLOPE” fallacy, wherein Mr. Sibal has warned of the small first step of the Court “interfering in triple-talaq” could culminate in “significantly negative consequences”. Fortunately for us, the snowball effect though is not spelled out in black and white as a threat though. Thank God for small mercies!

3.    On the same day, that is, March 16, 2017, he posed in his submissions:

“Why is the Centre so keen to raise doubts about the constitutional morality of Muslims' faith in the 1400-year-old practice of triple talaq…Who is the government to say that triple-talaq, evolved through social and family norms, is “un-Islamic.”

It is a fact that many Islamic scholars believe that apostasy in or renunciation of Islam is punishable by death. Yet, Government (or, rather, the Constitution, to be precise) confers on all citizens the freedom to convert from one faith to another as a fundamental right. Then again, some Islamic theologians quote the Quran to incite Muslims into waging violent Jihad against non-Muslims (infidels). But, any such violence against other religions is proscribed under our Constitution. Passionate rhetoric aside, the Counsel’s attempt in his argument─ a great example of the “RED HERRING” fallacy─ is to divert attention from “constitutional validity” of triple-talaq to the unrelated issue of the powers of government to question “morality of faith” and “conformity of practice with religion.”

4.    Further, on the same day, he went on record to say:

"If I have faith that Lord Rama was born at Ayodhya, then it's a matter of faith and there is no question of constitutional morality. And why should court interfere? Similar is the case with triple talaq."

Courts indeed are seized of the matter on whether Ayodhya is the birthplace of Lord Rama. Be as it may, triple talaq is not a matter of faith, but of customary practice. Various practices (e.g., Dahi Handi, Jallikattu, entry of women into Haji Ali Dargah, etc.) have been repeatedly questioned by the courts. By citing the Ayodhya example, the “FALSE ANALOGY / EQUIVALENCE” fallacy here is to equate the “harmless belief about the birthplace of an avatar of God” with the “practice of triple-talaq, which infringes on gender equality”.

5.    He later proclaimed:

“Sharia is personal law and not subject to fundamental rights.” 

Some Islamic clerics claim stoning for adultery and murder is an integral, mandatory part of Sharia. So, should such inhumane punishment be incorporated in our justice system as a form of retribution and/or deterrence? Nevertheless, the linking of the two assertions, namely, “Sharia is personal law” and “it is not subject to fundamental rights,” in the same sentence is a logical jump, typical of a “NON-SEQUITUR” fallacy. Despite being personal law, Sharia can either be subject to fundamental rights or not.

Further, the argument is a “BEGGING THE QUESTION” fallacy, because it provides the conclusion that “Sharia is not subject to fundamental rights” as a premise.

6.    Then again, it is reported that he averred:

“There should be reform, but it has to come from within the community. Others cannot dictate to us how we should reform. Many customs and usages practised by the Hindus need to be kicked out. But leave it to the communities to do so.”

Oh boy, isn’t the validity of customs and usages tested on the touchstone of the Constitution day in and day out? I mean, haven’t degenerate practices like untouchability, devadasi, dowry prohibition, human sacrifice, etc. been stopped through judicial intervention and legislative reform? Nonetheless, the point here is who has decreed that “reform should come from within”? No statutory norm, constitutional tenet or governmental authority has endorsed or proclaimed such a mechanism for social and religious reform. Mr. Sibal’s anointment of community for driving reform is a fabricated source of authority. Consequently, he constitutes the “FALSE ATTRIBUTION” fallacy.

7.    On the same day, he also alleged as follows:

“When it comes to Hindu law, you protect all customs but when it comes to Muslims, you start raising questions over customs. Like when it comes to Dowry prohibition Act or Guardianship Act you follow customs and protect them…Hindu laws of divorce and succession are more discriminatory than triple talaq.” 

The argument comes across as a pathetic sob story no doubt. Nonetheless, invoking victimhood to gain sympathy is at the crux of the argument, which adopts a “yo-mama” kind of stance to deflect the discourse in the “APPEAL TO HYPOCRISY” fallacy. In this “Whataboutism” though, Mr. Sibal forgets that the Dowry Prohibition Act was actually enacted to counter the widespread practice of dowry in Hindu communities. Consequently, his allegation is wild and hollow

8.    Finally on March 16, 2017, Kapil Sibal noted as follows:

“Many women in the Hanafi School accept it as a valid form of divorce. Majority of the Prophet's companions considered it good…It may be bad, it may be sinful, but women accept it.”

Just because some women accept triple-talaq (indeed there is no evidential or objective basis for the claim) does not mean that it is acceptable to ALL Muslim women. Neither does it indicate that the practice does not infringe on fundamental rights of women enshrined in Articles 14 and 15. The farfetched claim of Mr. Sibal is characteristic of the “FALACY OF COMPOSITION”. Indeed, he has inferred that “all” Muslim women accept triple-talaq, based on the presumable fact that the practice is acceptable to “some” Muslim women.

9.    On the next day, that is, May 17, 2017, Mr. Kapil Sibal submitted as follows:

“Just because a certain section of people was aggrieved by their personal laws, does not warrant a case to seek reform in the area.” 

Preposterous! Mr. Sibal had only declared the previous day that reform must come from within the community. But, with regard to the voices of dissent/reform raised from within the Islamic community against triple-talaq, he makes a complete U-turn by stating that it does not warrant the seeking of reform! Such selective use of facts is referred to as “CARD-STACKING” fallacy.  

10. Further, on the same day he noted:

“The Muslim community is like small birds on which golden eagle preys…the community's nests must have the Supreme Court protection."

An absolute shocker of a remark! Those comments are appropriate for a political harangue, not an argument in a judicial proceeding. What has the size of a section of society got to do with the legality or otherwise of its practices. It is patently clear that Mr. Sibal’s attempt here is to take the focus away from the “lawfulness or unlawfulness of a customary practice” to the “protection of minorities and their interests” in this “STRAW MAN ARGUMENT”, yet another fallacy in his submissions before the Apex Court.  

11. Later on he observed:

“Only 0.4 per cent is practising it (triple-talaq) and this is not a ground to strike it down.”

Hey! Only 0.01 per cent of the population are murderers. So, should they all be given free passes and not punished? Laughable indeed! The attempt at trivializing the practice notwithstanding, it behooves Mr. Sibal to realise that just 0.4% of the population of 200-million Muslims is a humongous number. Indeed, triple-talaq affects almost a million people. It is as if Mr. Sibal is saying: “it cannot be imagined how a practice affecting only 0.4% of people can be struck down. Hence, it must not be struck down.” The reasoning in the statement indeed is anchored in the “APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE” fallacy.

12. Then during hearings on May 18, 2017, Mr. Sibal claimed as follows:

“If there is a consensus among Muslim scholars that it is a practice then it is valid.”

A cursory reading of the ludicrous assertion shows that in Mr. Sibal opinion Islamic experts should concur to declare triple-talaq as a “practice”. There is no need to qualify the practice as “valid”, mind you. That in and by itself is enough to accord validity or sacramental sanctity for the practice. Indeed there is no dispute that the practice exists. However, the controversy is about whether the practice violates the fundamental rights of Muslim women, as enshrined in our Constitution. Besides, there is no consensus per se among Muslim scholars (in particular, Shia clergymen have openly denounced the practice as sinful and invalid). Therefore, the argument falls under the “FALSE AUTHORITY” fallacy. Clearly, Muslim scholars cannot be the arbiters of constitutional validity of triple-talaq.

13. Furthermore, he declared:

“There is nothing in the Quran which says triple talaq is not valid.”

All that I can tell Mr. Sibal is that the Quran does not prohibit the use of loudspeakers for azaan either. Yet, the Apex Court has banned the practice since noise pollution in the wee hours of morning violates the fundamental rights of people in the neighborhood. Similarly there is nothing in the Quran that proves triple-talaq is valid either, for the practice began in 637 AD (as admitted by the learned Counsel himself) after the death of the Prophet. The ingenuity here lies in the implication that somehow there is divine sanction for the practice. Thus, the reasoning is logically flawed since it suffers from the “DIVINE FALLACY”.

14. On that day, he further pleaded: 

“Lots of thing are happening in the society which are protected by customs. The court is not here to decide what is a sinful practice in the world…We are talking about rule of law.”

Guess this is the most hilarious of them all. The Learned Counsel has tied himself into knots with his argument. Sure enough customary practices do exist in society, provided they are constitutional valid. Customs that are ultra vires the Constitution have been held to be unlawful. For example, restrictions on the entry of women to the Haji Ali Dargah have been done away with.  

Indeed it is the duty of the Court to decide whether a certain practice, sinful or kosher or otherwise, is in contravention of fundamental rights and the rule of law. It is admitted that triple-talaq is ‘sinful’. Consequently, the controversy before the Court is whether the customary practice in question curtails individual rights under the Constitution of India, the supreme law of the land. Mr. Sibal provides incomplete details/evidence in his statements. Consequently, his tenuous argument suffers from the “CHERRY PICKING” fallacy.

These “Sibalisms” may not be all. Perhaps more gems can be found if the entire transcript of Mr. Sibal’s arguments were to be scrutinised. And to tweak an expression borrowed from former Minister, Mr. Shashi Tharoor, the list does constitute a “farrago of deceptions, misinformation and outright lies”.

In the interest of not only gender justice, equality and dignity, but also constitutional supremacy, I am confident that the Apex Court will see through the fallacies in the arguments. Indeed, justice shall prevail eventually!

Jai Hind!

Jammu-Kashmir: A Blot on the Concept of Bharat and the Vision of Dr. Ambedkar

Bharatavarsha (the ancient name for the Indian subcontinent) has historically been a land of great socio-cultural diversity and lingua-religious heterogeneity from times immemorial. The fragmented governance structure in the British Raj─ comprising of British India, a quasi-federation of provinces and presidencies on one hand, and, the suzerainty of princely states on the other─ only enhanced the regional and parochial fabric of India. On top, the British exercise of supremacy over and institution of polity for its territories was varied, eclectic and, often, nuanced.

Therefore, the main challenge before the Constituent Assembly was to weave together a unified, cohesive country within a diverse, pluralistic society. Dr. Ambedkar and the Drafting Committee not only conceived a robust central regime, but also provided for the seamless integration of motley princely states into that new, unified national identity. The assimilation was engineered with a unique blend of unitary and federal characteristics in the constitutional scheme. The objective was to curtail divisive or disruptive forces within a diverse society spread across disparate regions. Hence, Dr. Ambedkar envisioned and enshrined a strong, powerful Centre in the Constitution to minimise the threat of fissiparous tendencies within sections of people.  

Concept of “Sovereignty”

To fully appreciate the vision of Dr. Ambedkar, the architect of modern India, one has to comprehend the concept of “sovereignty” well. Judge Huber defined “sovereignty” in the famous Island of Palmas Case as the independent right to exercise “in regard to a portion of the globe, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” In other words, it is the supreme and overarching power of a country to enact and enforce laws within its territorial domain. The paramountcy cannot be shared or transferred. Possessing complete sovereignty is an essential attribute for the existence of any country.

There are two vital and complementary aspects to the concept of sovereignty, namely, ‘functional sovereignty’ and ‘seat of sovereignty’. ‘Seat of sovereignty’ denotes the moorings, that is, the source of sovereignty. It is the actual locus or situs where sovereignty rests and resides. On the contrary, ‘functional sovereignty’ is about how sovereignty manifests and gets exercised. The presence of a “cause and effect” relationship between “situs” and “functionality” as a distinguishing feature does not mean that sovereignty is divisible.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Vision

Dr. Ambedkar and the Constitution Makers envisaged the vesting of sovereignty with the people collectively and not severally or specifically to any specific group, class or segment of society. In fact, the realization that sovereignty had to be embodied in the people was indelibly imbued in the minds of the Constitution Makers. It was the ideological choice for the constitutional architecture of a new Bharat. The collective ownership and possession of sovereignty by the people of India was aimed at empowering the masses. It was also meant to prevent local, regional or sectoral aspirations and claims of sovereignty either transcending national unity or threatening territorial integrity.

The Constitution Makers endowed the Government of India and the state governments with the functional powers for exercising sovereignty on behalf of people of Bharat as a whole. Dr. Ambedkar expressed and embedded in the Constitution this notion of “the sovereign” through a participatory democracy with no limitations on the power or paramountcy of the people of India. Indeed his vision of sovereignty belonging to and residing in the people is the foundational principle of our Constitution.

Sovereignty under British Imperialism

A historical review of British imperialism and the independence struggle in the sub-continent during the 20^th Century sheds ample light on the progressive democratization of governance through relinquishment of powers to the people. After the rebellion of 1857 the corporate rule of British East India Company over the subcontinent was abolished and the “seat of sovereignty” transferred to the British Crown under the Government of India Act, 1858. Consequently, the Court of Directors of the company was dissolved and its powers transitioned to the Secretary of State for India, an appointee of the Crown. Likewise, the Board of Control, the arm of the British Government responsible till then for managing the empire’s interests in India, was disbanded too. 

The Act of 1858 also heralded the termination of dual governance of territories by the Crown and the Company that had existed earlier. It empowered the Crown to appoint its representative, the Viceroy, as the Head of Government in the subcontinent. The Viceroy was made responsible to the Secretary of State. This governance model continued despite modifications introduced through Government of India Acts of 1912, 1915 and 1919. In general, the form of government, in British India comprising of provinces and presidencies, was unitary in character with a strong, absolute central establishment, which derived its powers from the Crown. The princely states enjoyed varying degrees of limited autonomy as weak vassals under the suzerainty of the British Crown. Presidencies, provinces and the princely states derived their limited administrative authority through devolution under the sovereignty of the colonial power. In other words, jurisdictional powers, that is, “functional sovereignty” (limited as it was) flowed to the bottom from the “seat of sovereignty”, namely, the Crown at the top.  

The Government of India Act, 1935, was in response to the freedom struggle and demand of Indians for autonomy. The legislative changes in the Act of 1935 reflected the aspirations of people for self-rule. It provided for a bicameral “Federation of India” consisting of provinces and princely states, even as it excluded Burma from the territory of colonial India. But then, the enacted bicameralism and federalism did not materialize since the statutory prerequisite─ of a majority of invited princely states accepting the proposal─ was not met. British India continued to be governed under the provisions of the Act of 1919. The Federal Court was set up under the 1935 Act though. Provincial autonomy was accorded through the constitution of provincial and central legislatures, for which elections were held in 1937.

In effect, very little in the governance set-up changed after the Act of 1935. The “top-down” flow of “functional sovereignty” from the “seat of sovereignty”, the Crown endured. The “Strong Suzerainty-Weak Vassals” relationships between the British Crown and the princely states too continued as before.

The March towards Indian Independence

In the aftermath of World War II, calls for freedom became increasingly strident. With an economy ruined and ravaged by war, Britain lacked the resources to contain the escalating civic unrest in India. Strikes, protests and agitations galore took their toll. The Christmas Island Mutiny of 1942 portended a tinderbox-like situation in India even as the discovery of vast oil deposits in the Middle East marked a strategic shift in geopolitical compulsions. Finally, the landslide win of the pro-decolonisation, Clement-Atlee-led Labour Party, against the imperialistic Conservative Party in the general elections of 1945, indeed sounded the death knell on the British Empire in the subcontinent. So, in September 1945, Viceroy Lord Wavell called for fresh elections to the legislatures of British India provinces. It was also declared that a constitution-making body would be convened after the elections. A total of 1585 seats went for the polls in December 1945 and January 1946 under the Government of India Act, 1935.

The Bombay Revolt of February, 1946 was perhaps the straw that broke the camel’s back. It surely would have put to rest any thoughts of procrastination that the British may have harboured on the transfer of power in India. Soon the British Government constituted and sent a 3-member, ministerial team on a mission to discuss with Indian leaders and devise the plan for devolution of power. This Cabinet Mission’s main aim was to pave the way for India’s freedom.

In the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 (proposed on 16^th June, 1946), the twin-nation theory was propounded as a compromise formula to satisfy the aspirations of Congress and Muslim League. A long-term settlement plan was conceptualised, envisaging a “Union of India” with a relatively-weak centre and strong provinces. The Congress Working Committee (CWC) disapproved of the limited powers afforded to the Centre in the plan. As a proponent of a strong “Central authority”, it did not officially accept the plan. Yet, it resolved to join the proposed Constituent Assembly for framing the constitution of a free, united and democratic India. The Congress, and later the Muslim League, participated jointly in the “interim government” formed in September 1946, despite initial reservations against its composition.

Eventually, the Constituent Assembly was convened in December 1946. A total of 292 seats in the Constituent Assembly were assigned to British India provinces and presidencies. The newly-elected representatives in the provincial assemblies indirectly elected members of the Constituent Assembly, through a single transferable-vote system of proportional representation. The total membership of the Constituent Assembly was 389, consisting of 292, 93 and 4 representatives respectively of provinces, princely states and chief commissioner provinces of Delhi, Ajmer-Mewar, Coorg and British Baluchistan.

Explaining the effects of the Cabinet Mission Plan, N Gopalaswami Ayyangar later stated in the Constituent Assembly that:

“…sovereign powers over India as a whole now vest in His Majesty… Those powers are exercisable both over British India and over Indian States, though the quantum of those powers and the manner of their exercise differ… The act of ceding sovereignty, that is transfer of the power…relate to the whole of India…. The Mission's statement, therefore, that when British power is withdrawn, the States become independent, should be construed to mean that such sovereignty as His Majesty in fact exercises over Indian States will stand ceded back to the people of those States.”

Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the Princely States

Much of the Cabinet Mission’s efforts were aimed at the formulation of a plan, acceptable to both Congress and Muslim League, for the transfer of sovereignty to the people of India on the lapse of British paramountcy and declaration of independence. Further, the Mission declared that the suzerainty of the Crown over the princely states would cease on the devolution of power to the two proposed dominions of India and Pakistan. All bipartite relations, treaty engagements and mutual obligations between the Crown and each of the princely states were to be unilaterally dissolved and abrogated on partition of India. The princely states were not to be recognised as separate international entities. Yet, under the twin-nation formula, the rulers were assured that they would be absolutely free to join one or other of the two successor-Dominions. They were advised though that wishes of people and territorial contiguity should be factored into their respective choice of accession. Pending the final decision of the States’ accession, the respective Dominion was to assume duties of protection borne till then by Britain. Mr. Clement Atlee, Prime Minister of United Kingdom, confirmed this arrangement in his address on the then tabled Indian Independence Bill, 1947, in the House of Commons on 10^th July, 1946. The British Government position was reiterated by Mr. William Hare, the Earl of Listowel and Secretary of State for India and Burma, during his speech on 16^th July, 1946, in the House of Lords.

Indeed, the Indian Independence Act, 1947─ passed by the British Parliament and assented to by the Crown on 18^th July 1946─ accorded independence to and created only the two Dominions of India and Pakistan. Further, the Act in its entirety makes no express provision about the transfer of power to the princely states. Besides, various Sections of the Act─ specifically Sections 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) ─ only provide for the accession of princely states into either of the Dominions and removal of difficulties and impediments to such accession. In fact, the Prime Minister Mr. Clement Atlee unambiguously clarified the British position on the status of princely states, in the House of Commons on 10^th July, 1946, as follows:

“It would...be unfortunate if, owing to the formal severance of their paramountcy relations with the Crown, [the Princely States] were to become islands cut off from the rest of India…In fact, already a large number of the States have declared their willingness to enter into relationships with the new Dominions, and some have been represented in the Constituent Assembly of India. It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that all States will, in due course, find their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions…If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government to any State which has decided to cut adrift from its neighbors and assert its independence, I would say to the ruler of that State, "Take your time and think again. I hope that no irrevocable decision to stay out will be taken prematurely."

Thus, when a ruler executed the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India, he surrendered paramountcy over all territories of his state to the Dominion of India. Consequently, any sovereignty or independence claims ceased and subjects therein became an integral part of the common pool of the “People of India”. By sanctioning integration with the new Dominion of India, the plenipotentiary rights of the ruler, over the territory of the princely state, got merged into the national pool of sovereignty, represented collectively by the Union. Besides, representation of princely states in the Constituent Assembly of India was subject to and contingent upon the acceptance of the resolution passed on the Aims and Objectives.

Accession of Jammu-Kashmir

In the specific case of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu-Kashmir, the ruler not only executed the Instrument of Accession to establish an “irrevocable relationship” with India, but also nominated four representatives to the Constituent Assembly of India. Hence, when the nominees, namely, Messrs. Sheikh M. Abdullah, M.M. Afzal Beg, M.M. Sayeed Masoodi and Motiram Baigra, took the pledge and signed the “Members Register” of the Constituent Assembly on 16^th June, 1949, the integration of all the territories of that erstwhile princely State of Jammu-Kashmir with India assumed finality.

The Constitution was framed keeping in mind a unified India within the diverse ethos. The unification was accomplished through an atypical “federal structure”.  Dr. Ambedkar was convinced that if the princely states were allowed to retain sovereignty, then territorial integrity would become fragile, thus defeating the very vision of a “united, well-integrated” Bharat. It would also jeopardise the installation of an effective participatory democracy. And, most importantly, such a construct would run contrary to the basic tenet of the People of India being the true owners of sovereignty.

Therefore, the Constitution was drafted to provide for a strong centre based on the foundational tenet that the People of Bharat are the “repository of sovereignty”. This cardinal principle is apparent from the resolution that Sri. J. Nehru moved in the Constituent Assembly on 13^th December, 1946 stating:

“This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic…WHEREIN the territories…shall be a Union…WHEREIN all power and authority…are derived from the people…”

It has been fallaciously argued that the ruler of Jammu-Kashmir retained limited sovereignty and did not merge with the Dominion of India, consequent to which the State Government, as successor to the ruler, enjoys special status and autonomous character. The flawed, irrational reasoning stems from the Instrument of Accession, which states:

“8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my Sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as a Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.”

The contention that the State of Jammu-Kashmir possessed “limited sovereignty” is faulty. Indeed, Para 8 does not unequivocally qualify the noun “continuance of my Sovereignty” with either “to perpetuity” or “in the interim”. Nonetheless, the only logical conclusion is that the vesting of sovereignty in the ruler was of a “transient nature” and it got extinguished once the ruler’s representatives partook in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly of India and adoption of the Constitution. A contrarian interpretation would obstruct and frustrate the flow of sovereignty to any other state, person or entity.

Integration of Princely States

Further, the inclusion of representatives of the erstwhile princely states in the Constituent Assembly of India implied their complete and seamless merger with the Republic of India. It also snuffed out any and all paramountcy rights or claims of the ruler, a necessary condition for ensuring parity between provinces and princely states in the new Union of India. Then again, any sovereign apparatus, be it monarchic or democratic state, ultimately derives its sanction from the will of the people. In this day and age, it would be impossible for hereditary monarchs to maintain sovereignty under the mediaeval or archaic creed of divine right or endowed authority.  This idea was completely discarded with the creation of the Constituent Assembly of India, which consisted of delegates from all provinces and princely states, who collectively represented the entire nation. Hence, the constitution of sovereign, independent Bharat is the concrete expression of the will of all people, its “situs of sovereignty”, as a whole.

The princely states did not treat themselves special or unequal constituents of the nation vis-à-vis the provinces. The spirit of unity was commensurately reflected in the speeches of their representatives during the debates. The delegate from the State of Baroda, Sir B.L. Mitter’s sentiments─ echoed by Sardar K.M. Panikkar of the State of Bikaner─ epitomized the nationalistic fervor within the Constituent Assembly. He articulated as follows:

“We, the States, are an integral part of India… We, therefore, want to share the responsibility of framing the Constitution…We are at one with you in that the Indian Union should be strong in the Centre so that India may hold her head high in the comity of nations. We do not believe in isolated independent existence, which can only weaken the Union. We shall join you wholeheartedly in a spirit of co-operation and not in any spirit or securing special privileges at the cost of the Union.”

The assertions of the representatives of princely states, as also the inherent legal mechanism of a body composed with representatives of people and bestowed with constituent power, signify the merger of their sovereign identity and political existence into the new country of Bharat. Hence, sovereignty resides wholly and squarely in all the people of India, and NOT either partly with any State Government or separately with the people of any class, group or sector, such as, say, the residents of Jammu-Kashmir.

Extent of Federalism in the Constitution of India

There are for sure many distinct forms of constitutional structures and governance models, which define the relationship between the Union and the constituent states or provinces within the Union. In the “unitary form”, the Centre, that is, the Union is strong as compared to the constituent states and wields most, if not all, the powers. Being endowed with less or minimal powers, the constituent states are weak. The United Kingdom is a good example of a “unitary form” of political structure. In the “federal form”, the balance of power tilts towards the constituent states, which enjoy a great deal of discretion. Though Union-State linkages exist, the constituent states are empowered with greater degree of legislative and administrative freedoms. The United States of America has a federal structure in its polity.

Our Constitution Makers described “India, that is Bharat” as a “Union of States” [and not as “Federation of States”] in Article 1. Considerable thought and discussion went into this foundational aspect of our nationhood. Dr. Ambedkar repeatedly rejected pleas to add ‘federation’ instead of ‘union’. The word ‘union’ prevents constituent states from having the freedom to secede from the union. This unifies all States in perpetuity, no doubt. It also means that they all are equal in status, without any of them being eligible for unique claims or special privileges of their own.

Through Article 1, the framers of our Constitution demolished the distinction between the erstwhile British India territories and the princely states. Article 1 defines all constituent units of India as ‘States’ irrespective of whether they were provinces, presidencies or princely states earlier. The use of the word ‘States’ in “Union of States”, which refers to an inseparable unit of India territory, is not to be confused with that in “princely states”.  Further, Article 1 references the list the States comprising Bharat in Schedule 1, which includes the State of Jammu-Kashmir. Indeed, the bogey of “autonomy” and “special status” are often raised baselessly in case of Jammu-Kashmir.

An irrefutable fact is that the “Dominion of India” came into existence as an integral entity first under the Indian Independence Act, 1947. On the lapse of British paramountcy, “functional sovereignty” devolved onto the “successor Government of India”. The “seat of sovereignty” though was transferred to the People of India, who elected representatives to the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly then exercised its “constituent power” to draft, adopt and ratify Constitution of India, which conferred “constituted power” on States for the exercise of “constitutional duties” by “constitutional authorities”.

The division of powers between the central and state governments is enshrined as a crucial facet of the Constitution, which is devolutionary in nature. Thus, there is delegation or decentralization, as the case may be, of some powers onto the constituent units, namely, the States, which were created through the exercise of powers vested in the Constituent Assembly.

The foregoing bears testament to the fact that Bharat has been envisioned and established as a robust union of states with federal characteristics. Contrarily, US federalism emanates from the constituent States, which came together to form the Centre. Indeed, nowhere in the Constitution of India is the word “federal” used except to refer to “Federal Courts”, which were constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935. Use of the word “federal” would have perhaps diminished the import of the unitary features of India, the “Union of States”. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has variously described our Constitution as: “more unitary than federal”, “[having] strong unitary features” and so on in its judgments. The Sarkaria Commission observation that our Constitution “…has federal features…not…in classical sense” too reflects the consonance, consistency of views. Dr. Ambedkar clarified the rationale during the Constituent Assembly debates as follows:

“India…, the Federation was not the result of an agreement by the States to join in a Federation…. The Federation is a Union because it is indestructible. Though the country and the people may be divided into different States for convenience of administration the country is one integral whole, its people a single people living under a single imperium derived from a single source. The Americans had to wage a civil war to establish that the States have no right of secession and that their Federation was indestructible. The Drafting Committee thought that it was better to make it clear at the outset….”

National Unity and Integrity under the Constitution

The third theme is that India was envisaged as a unified, cohesive nation endued with a strong Centre.  This would gather the power of the people at the centre, that is, the Union to create a unified country, rather than a group of fragmented segments claiming individual sovereignty. Thus, the country remains de jure unitary.  The Constitution endows a majority of the powers on the Centre, which is strong vis-à-vis the units, i.e. constituent States. This arrangement was necessary to foster the feeling of integration in the country and effective administration. He was convinced that only a strong centre could ensure that regional differences do not dominate operating political discourse or structures. Furthermore, invested with residuary powers, the Centre has grown to overshadow and eclipse the State Governments over time. The strong centre not only acts as a strong centripetal force that binds the country together, but also introduces uniformity and ease of administration. The Union Government also has the power, freedom and authority to interfere in the affairs of a State whenever it is expedient in the interests of the nation. The constitutional construct becomes unitary in such scenarios.

Unity of the nation could not be compromised due to regional diversity or political divergences. Dr. Ambedkar overcame two weaknesses of stereotypical federalism, namely, “arduous rigidity” in the Centre-State division of powers and “acute legalism” that requires frequent judicial intervention for interpreting provisions and determining constitutionality of actions. These weaknesses are endemic to any federal system, which adopts dual polity and loose coupling of Union-State. He inculcated federal characteristics in our Constitution through a long list of concurrent subjects, which helps achieve “higher degree of flexibility” and “fewer transgression of powers” in Centre-State relations.

The Indian constitution, though embracing federalism limitedly, achieves uniformity in “basic matters that are vital for maintaining unity.” Explaining this point in the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar said that:

“A dual judiciary, a duality of legal codes and a duality of civil services…are the logical consequences of a dual polity…inherent in a federation. The Indian Federation, though a dual polity, has no dual judiciary at all. The High Courts and the Supreme Court form one single integrated judiciary having jurisdiction and providing remedies in all cases… This is done to eliminate all diversity in all remedial procedure.”

Dr. Ambedkar achieved uniformity and unity of the Indian federation through commonality of basic laws, especially civil, corporate and criminal statutes (such as penal code, property laws, law of evidence, etc.), be they substantive or procedural laws. These subjects are either placed in the Union list or in the Concurrent List in order to preserve unity without impeding or impairing federalism.

Besides, the Indian Constitution provides for dual service. Yet, it reserves certain strategic posts in its administrative set-up for the civil services cadre at the Union. Again, without depriving or disrupting the right of States to form their own civil services and administrative machinery, a pan-India recruitment exists for appointment of bureaucrats with uniform scale of pay and inter-state transferability within the Union. Thus, Dr. Ambedkar created multiple institutions which ensure that the nation remains strong and unified through these three crucial provisions, namely, single, seamless judiciary, common civil services for manning important posts, and, uniformity-in fundamental substantive and procedural laws encompassing civil and criminal matters.

Provisions in the Jammu-Kashmir Constitution

Eventually, the Constitution of India came into force on 26^th January, 1950. Under the “temporary provisions of Article 370” in the Constitution of India, elections in the State were held in 1951 for the formation of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu-Kashmir. The Assembly, invested with the power to draft the Constitution for the State within the constitutional framework of India, began its work on 5^th November, 1951. After an impassioned address by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad on 15^th February, 1954, the members of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu-Kashmir passed a unanimous resolution ratifying the irrevocable accession of the State with the Union of India by adopting the “Report of the Drafting Committee”.

After about five years of exhaustive debates and discussions, the Constitution of Jammu-Kashmir was adopted and it come into force fully on 26^th January, 1957. The Constitution of Jammu-Kashmir categorically declares in Sections 3 and 5 as follows:

“3. Relationship of the State with the Union of India.─ The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.

…

5. Extent of Executive and Legislative Power of the State.─ The executive and legislative power of the State extends to all matters except those with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State under…the Constitution of India.”

On top, Section 147 affirms that any provision of the Constitution of Jammu-Kashmir except Sections 3, 5 and 147 may be amended. From the foregoing, it is amply clear that the State of Jammu-Kashmir merged their identity with the Union of India. In short, the integration with India of Jammu-Kashmir is irreversible. Hence, it is subject to the “seat of sovereignty” vested in the People of India as a composite group and not people belonging to any one narrow State, group, class or segment.

There is a tendency in some quarters to make a case for partial sovereignty, by misconstruing the words: “We, the people of Jammu & Kashmir…” in the Preamble of the Constitution of that State. It behooves the protagonists of this view to keep in mind not only that the phrase is a replica of the language in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, but also that the people of Jammu-Kashmir, as an identifiable group, are not historically extraneous to or ethnically incongruous with the people of India. Neither can the Preamble be interpreted in isolation of the operative parts of any Constitution. When the representatives of the erstwhile princely state partook in the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly of India and adopted the Constitution of India on November 26, 1949, Jammu-Kashmir became an integral part of Indian territories and a State subject to its jurisdiction. It was added to the First Schedule of the Constitution of India as a “Part-B” State along with other princely states such as Mysore, Hyderabad, etc. Thus, the identity and destiny of Jammu-Kashmir were merged into that of India, a nation of immense diversity, yet, created with unity of purpose, fraternity of people and harmony of values.

Concluding Remarks

The State of Jammu-Kashmir deviates from the vision of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. It transgresses several wise and well-founded principles of our Constitution Makers. The aberrations extend to denying original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Duality of domestic laws in that State has created problems too. A cursory scrutiny shows that many substantive and procedural laws of India are invalid there. This has unfortunately led to the curtailment of minority rights (e.g., lack of reservation for other backward castes, etc.); discrimination against women (e.g., property and inheritance rights, inapplicability of Section 304-B of IPC on presumption of dowry deaths, etc.); and, derogation of fundamental rights (e.g., right to education, inapplicability of Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution of India, etc.).  

Dr. Ambedkar was a visionary, who realised that unity and uniformity should be the pillars of the Constitution. The essence of the concept of Bharat, as enshrined in the Constitution, is equality and equal treatment of all persons and constituent States, regardless of region, class or segment. He was aware that any special treatment of even one former princely state would create insurmountable challenges for the supremacy of the Constitution of India.

Despite not having solid legal, political or historical grounds, there are many discordant voices demanding separate constitutional identity in the State of Jammu-Kashmir because of the failure to respect Dr. Ambedkar’s vision for India and its uniform application throughout India. The misguided political activists, Kashmiri separatists, Pakistani sympathisers and their ilk, within Jammu-Kashmir and without, are jeopardizing the long-term prosperity of the state and its people.

Thus, the only long-term, sustainable solution for all the social, economic and political woes of Jammu-Kashmir is the implementation of the vision of Dr. Ambedkar in letter and spirit.

The abrogation of Article 370 would be a good beginning!