Aadhar, Corruption and Commonsense - The Last Nail in the Coffin

My earlier blog posts [of Mar. 28, 2014; Apr. 8, 2014 and Apr. 11, 2014] focused on the legal, constitutional and technological aspects of the Aadhar project. 

While all the criticisms in those posts are valid, relevant and necessary, none of them is sufficient for countering the argument in Aadhar’s favour, viz.,

“Aadhar helps remove corruption; it ensures effective implementation of social welfare programmes.” 

Really, I too was blown off my feet when I looked at that justification. That was only till I applied my mind to it. What emerged was a different picture, one that shows Aadhar in the poorer light of being neither fraud-proof nor corruption-proof.

To make out my case, I will start with a review of the Public Distribution System (PDS), as it exists today.

State of PDS Affairs

It is not mandatory to get a ration card in India.  But, it is a must for obtaining subsidized rations from the PDS network of “fair price shops”. There are three types of ration cards - EPL (Extreme Poverty Level), BPL (Below Poverty Line) and APL (Above Poverty Line). Eligibility depends on the economic status of the family.

The Constitution of India empowers (Article 246; List II in the Seventh Schedule) the Legislature of any State to make laws with respect to the control of procurement, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain foodstuffs and essential commodities to targeted sections of society through a network of retail outlets called ‘fair price shops/depots’ or ‘ration shops’. 

Accordingly, the powers to administer the Public Distribution System vest with the State Government, which distributes the commodities allotted to the State by the Government of India. The allotment is based on the number of ration cards. This is an important constituent of the strategy for food security, particularly to poor and vulnerable sections of society.

Issue of Ration Card in Karnataka

The process flow for issue of ration cards in Karnataka is as follows: 

• First an (online) application is filed along with documents in support of identity, age, residential address and income level.
• The concerned “food inspector” records the receipt of the application in the prescribed register.
• The food inspector inspects the application and schedules an appointment with the applicant to verify originals of documents submitted in support of age, identity, etc., to determine eligibility for issue of a ‘ration card’.
• After documentary verification, the biometric data of all members of the applicant’s family is collected. The District Supply Office appoints private firms for the registration and collection of biometric data.
• The inspector then visits the applicant’s home address to determine income level (e.g., type of home, vehicles possessed, etc.) and verify entitlements for certain commodities (for e.g., only those households without LPG connections are eligible for supply of kerosene). 
• If the food inspector is satisfied about the eligibility of the applicant for the issue of a ration card, he approves the application. 
• The District Supply Office (DSO) then issues the ration card to the applicant. 
• The card-holder is required to report and get registered any changes in the household status, such as, change of member names or address, births, deaths, etc. 
• The ration card holder then obtains such subsidized, essential commodities (food grains, kerosene, etc.) at affordable prices. 

Systemic Loopholes; Endemic Leakages 

Any layman studying the existing system can recognise that despite checks and balances, there is ample scope for dishonesty and corruption. Major areas for fraudulent subversion of the civil supplies system may pertain to: 

1. Issue of ration cards (e.g., EPL, BPL, etc.) to ineligible persons: This is typically based on false declaration and fraudulent verification of income levels. It can go on with or without the connivance of government officials.
2. Issue of multiple (i.e., duplicate) cards to a household: This can be accomplished in collusion with the food inspector or otherwise. For e.g., a joint family can possess two cards: one card showing father as head of household and son as member and the other, showing son in a separate, nuclear family. Home addresses and names of family members can be modified or misrepresented to facilitate this.
3. Issue of fake or bogus cards: Again achieved with the connivance of the food inspector or otherwise, ration cards can be issued to non-existent “ghost households”. Ration cards can have imaginary individuals fraudulently included by bribing corrupt officials.
4. Non-existent family members: Deaths in a family may not get registered with the concerned authority. Furthermore, family members domiciled in a different place may continue to appear on the ration card.
5. Low quality of commodities: Adulterated and contaminated commodities may be supplied in ration stores.
6. Skimming and diversion of supplies: PDS shop owners, in collusion with government officials, may divert subsidized commodities to the open market. Some ration shops may even hoard and black-market essential commodities that are in short supply. Others may over-charge, falsify wastage or under-measure supplies.
7. Siphoning off unused quota: PDS shop owners, in cahoots with corrupt officials, may divert unused quotas to open markets. The unused quota is shown as fully used-up in books of the shop-owner.

Needless to say, the above scams lead to an inflated number of beneficiaries. It also imposes higher subsidy loss / burden on government. Often organised gangs, of ration shop keepers, government officials, criminals and touts) are involved in these rackets.

Plugging leakages with Aadhar  

Clearly Aadhar can play no role in plugging systemic lacunae numbered 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the list above.  

However, Aadhar can potentially play a pivotal role in eliminating loopholes nos. 2 and 3 in those states, where, unlike Karnataka, biometric data is not captured as part of issue of ration cards. That is however a major assumption, since questions exist regarding:

(a) Quality achieved in successfully recording and de-duplicating biometric data; 

(b) Accuracy, consistency and reliability of “biometric pattern matching” during the identity authentication process; and, 

(c) System ability and availability to validate identity at anytime from anywhere with timeliness.

Thus, Failure to Enroll (FTE) rate, False Accept Rate (FAR) and False Reject Rate (FRR) all play a major role in determining the effectiveness of the biometric. And on top, there is the key metric of ‘stability’ of the biometric data over the lifetime of the individual. 

Effectiveness of Aadhar Biometrics 

A 4G Identity Solutions document (note: 4G-IDS is a supplier of biometric devices to UIDAI) makes interesting observations on fingerprinting efficacy.

1. Fingerprints de-duplication is cost effective only for small population and the cost of de-duplication goes up significantly due to manual intervention required for de-duplicating huge populations. 
2. Fingerprints are susceptible to bad data such as inability of a scanner to read dirty fingerprints clearly. People above 60 years and young children below 12 years may have difficulty enrolling in a fingerprinting system,due to their faded prints or underdeveloped fingerprint ridges. 
3. It is estimated that approximately 5% of any population has unreadable fingerprints, either due to scars or aging or illegal prints. In the Indian environment, experience has shown that the failure to enroll is as high as 15% (i.e., equivalent of about 200 million people in India) due to the prevalence of a huge population dependent on manual labour. 

Iris scanning does offer benefits of very high accuracy. But then, unlike fingerprinting, it is very expensive; it requires a lot of data storage space and network bandwidth for identity authentication in the field. 

Besides, effectiveness of the Aadhar identity validation service is questionable given that availability of non-stop power supply is a major issue in India, especially rural areas. Plus, it is unknown how reliable, robust and rugged identity authentication devices are likely to be in the dusty, hostile, often extreme operating environments of India - hot ‘n humid at some places; cold ‘n frigid at others; dry at some times of the year and wet ‘n damp at other times.

Grass-root Level Corruption and Criminal Activity 

The key question though is whether Aadhar can counter corruption effectively if determined criminal gangs are hell bent on exploiting and undermining the system.  

The answer is an emphatic NO!! 

In fact, Aadhar might increase leakages, because it enables illegal migrants to obtain Aadhar cards.  After all, it just takes an introducer's signature for such illegal foreign nationals to enroll themselves in UIDAI. Besides, creation of fake identities, by registering manipulated biometric data, is easier, particularly with the active involvement of enrolling agencies in such rackets. For instance, left slap and thumb prints of one person; right slap prints of another can be used to create a fake identity. It is equally easy to create bogus identities with the biometrics of the old and blind (unreadable fingerprints and non-existent irises).  

Further, rations can be withdrawn from fair-price stores either by claiming that sophisticated biometric validation devices are defective or by sabotaging them. Indeed, we can’t put the use of such devious and fraudulent methods beyond determined criminals. Can we? 

A worse scenario is that of identity theft. With the active involvement of enrollment agencies, criminals can have the biometrics of dead people replaced and continue to use their identities. Such nefarious plots can be hatched to hijack the identities of the living too.

Fighting Flaws and Failings 

Before implementing a high-cost, high-risk system like UIDAI, it would have definitely made sense for the government first to take several measures to strengthen the system at the ground level. A few measures that can be taken are: 

1. Greater accountability of officials combined with better vigilance mechanisms.
2. Periodic inspection of households and verification of beneficiaries to eliminate fake, bogus and ineligible cards.
3. Integration of all other identity databases in the country, such as driver’s licenses, bank accounts, voter IDs, birth and death registries, etc.
4. Postal address coding and standardization. 
5. More stringent penal provisions for fake identities and illegal residents. 
6. Fast track courts and summary proceedings for prosecuting accused guilty of defrauding the public distribution system.

Conclusion

So the big question: How foolproof, fail-proof and FRAUD-PROOF is the Aadhar system? 

Unless we have a concrete answer based on incontrovertible evidence, the conclusion is that Aadhar is a damn costly and risky venture. 

Or, should I say, adventure?